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Exchange Gains in the Trade between Florence and England 
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Bills of exchange were ubiquitous in extra-territorial trade within Western 
Europe during the late medieval period. Merchant-banking firms such as the Bardi 
and the Peruzzi made abundant use of this legal instrument that circumvented the 
directive by the Catholic Church against the lending of funds for interest. Bills of 
exchange stated that the borrower had to repay the advance at a later time, in another 
location and in another currency. Because no implicit interest rate was stated on the 
agreement all gains and the occasional loss that were realized on this trade of 
currencies were foreign exchange. Although both the Bardi and the Peruzzi were 
large for their day, both declared bankruptcy within a short time of each other, in the 
mid-fourteenth century.  The analysis of foreign exchange transactions during the 
fourteenth century reveals that although gains on the use of bills of exchange were 
reasonable, they were insufficient to ward off the combined effects of an economic 
recession combined with the after-effects of war, pestilence, a steadily declining 
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CHAPTER  I 
 INTRODUCTION WITH AN OVERVIEW OF THE MEDIEVAL ECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
The Bardi and the Peruzzi in the late 1200s to the mid-1300s were merchant-
banking firms having extra-territorial scope and repute; they were also considered 
financial and mercantile giants of their day. Both firms similarly suffered the 
ignominy of bankruptcy that, most believe, resulted principally from the issuance of 
loans to various high-ranking nobles and kings and from their subsequent refusal of 
requests for repayment. The study of the overall financial, business and managerial 
functions of these firms have been well investigated by Raymond De Roover, Robert 
Lopez, Reinhold C. Mueller, Edwin Hunt, among others; however, there still remains 
specific areas which are relatively unexplored. One of these is the extent to which 
foreign exchange gains affected the overall financial viability of these firms. The 
purpose of this thesis will be to explore how involvement in foreign exchange 
transactions, through the use of bills of exchange, impacted the bottom line of the 
Bardi and of the Peruzzi. 
However, the study of medieval foreign exchange cannot be adequately 
pursued without first understanding the impediments existing within the economic 
environment and the societal restrictions prevalent at that time. An example that 
provides insight to these conditions is found in the opening phrase of business 
contracts with the words, A nome di Dio e guadagnio
1
. Indeed, under the auspices 
of these opening words, the partnership agreement that inaugurated the Alberti 
                                                 
1
 In the name of God and profit. 
2 
 
Company in 1308 went on to outline the terms, conditions and purpose of this 
mercantile firm as well as the responsibilities and duties of the respective partners.
2
  
This business document that bonded the three Alberti brothers in their pursuit of 
commerce was neither extraordinary nor unique for its day. Such documents, 
invoking the guidance of God in the pursuit of profit as their opening statement, go 
back to at least the mid-thirteenth century.  However, what is important to note, in 
these opening words, is the strong influence religion had on trade in Western 
European society in the late medieval period.
3
   
Canon law viewed the pursuit of trade with suspicion since, in the opinion of the 
Church, moneymaking endeavours unleashed the temptations of avarice and usury 
along with a host of other carnal vices upon the purity of the immortal soul of the 
merchant. However disconcerting to the Church fathers the pursuit of commerce was, 
they also recognized the pragmatic fact that neither individuals nor nations could exist 
in a vacuum, and as such, trade was deemed an essential aspect of the physical world. 
However, trade was only tolerated as long as the pursuit of profit could be justified at 
a religious level; this implied that commerce was not pursued for its own sake, but 
solely for the sustainment of the individual and for catering to the needs of the 
community. Therefore, the consciences of merchants were caught in a dichotomy 
pitting sacred wants versus secular desires, the worldly aspirations of merchants 
                                                 
2
 Raymond De Roover,  Business, Banking and Economic Thought in Late Medieval and Early Modern 
Europe: Selected Studies of Raymond de Roover, ed. Julius Kirshner (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1974), 71. 
 
3




toward the accumulation of goods and riches were constantly being challenged by 
their religious belief concerning the future bliss of their immortal souls.
4 
 
This struggle pitting spiritual wants versus fleshly desires seriously dampened 
the flow of entrepreneurial endeavours. In this regard, mercantile activity had no 
greater impediment than the religious imposition against the use of usury.  This meant 
forbidding the lending of funds for a rate, or amount, of interest or indeed the 
borrowing of funds at interest for commercial purposes. The Catholic Church, up until 
the twelfth century, condemned the taking of usury as a sin against charity but not 
against justice; in fact, various civil codes actually permitted the lending of money at 
interest. However, the use of usury was severely censored from 1139 onwards. The 
Catholic Church held those guilty of usury condemned as sinners against justice and 
they were punishable by excommunication.
5
  As referred to in Roy C. Cave and 
Herbert H. Coulson’s A Source Book for Medieval Economic History, Thomas 
Aquinas reiterated the Aristotelian concept that money, in itself, is barren and is 
simply a medium of exchange. Interpreted in this manner, money could therefore bear 
no fruit or interest. A lender could only receive compensation for real damages, which 
could mean lost profits or actual losses incurred because he had lent the funds. On the 
other hand the borrower could only legitimately receive funds repayable with interest 
from one who was a usurer by profession, and by definition this meant someone who 
was not of the Catholic faith. The added proviso for this transaction was that the 
                                                 
4
 De Roover, Business, 72, 73. 
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 Roy C. Cave, and Herbert H. Coulson, eds., A Source Book for Medieval Economic History (New 








In practice, the prosecution of the crime of usury was not as straight-forward. 
For example, in England, although the Catholic Church claimed exclusivity in 
determining if usury had been committed, in reality there was an overlapping of 
jurisdiction which the ecclesiastical courts shared with secular courts when it came to 
actually prosecuting these cases. Since ecclesiastical, and for that matter secular, 
bureaucracy was lacking in England in seeking out usurers, cases were usually 
initiated when residents of parishes lodged a complaint with either the Church or with 
the secular authorities. In such cases involving public or manifest usurers brought 
before ecclesiastical courts the records show that few involved large loans rather the 
majority of cases loans consisted mostly of small amounts but bearing high rates of 
interest. For example, in a sample of twenty-eight legal cases, which were found of 
being guilty of usury, the largest amount involved was a little over £24, most amounts 
were far smaller, and the rates of interest charged annually ranged from 7.50% to 
50.00% with a mean annual rate of interest of 16.67%.  The small amounts involved 
implies that charges of usury usually implicated those individuals who loaned funds to 
small merchants or to private borrowers and all of whom resided within a reasonable 
distance from each other. What is noteworthy was that not all interest rates were 
considered usurious there was a societal distinction between moderate rates of 
interest, which was permitted, and usury. This differentiation was accepted at a 
secular level not only in England but also in various parts of Europe.  Which rates 
                                                 
6
 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province 




were deemed usurious and which rates were not was policed at a societal level by the 
local residents who brought, whom they deemed to be, a usurer to the attention of the 
authorities. In England, the Church courts tacitly accepted this distinction and did not 
seek out to prosecute those charging, what was locally accepted by the residents, a 
moderate rate of interest on their loans. Even if judicial proceedings were initiated in 
cases of usury, there seemed to be a certain amount of flexibility available to the 
accused. Judges permitted, perhaps even encouraged, private out of court settlements, 
since dismissals appeared frequently in the court records.
7
 
For elite individuals such as merchant-bankers who dealt in large sums with a 
select clientele the rules were different, because they were not considered manifest 
usurers due nature of their business.  This was a reflection of not only official policy 
but also popular sentiment in Northern Italy. These wealthy individuals, once the need 
arose to be absolved of their sins, admitted their errors in the privacy of the 
confessional. This procedure allowed them to bypass the strict sanctions of canon law 
against usury, in that they simply were allowed to make restitution to those whom 
they had allegedly defrauded. If, however, the victims were remote or even unknown 
then restitution was made to the poor, which generally meant that funds, the exact 
amount was determined by the confessor, went to an ecclesiastical institution. 
Because in the eyes of the clergy the poor, wherever they may be, were deemed to be 
but one member in the greater unity of the Catholic Church. Indeed, it has been 
argued that restitution to the poor was simply a means to finance construction projects 
and to enrich the Church. Also, restitution socially benefited the penitent merchant 
                                                 
7
 R.H. Helmolz, “Usury and the Medieval English Church Courts,” Speculum 16, No. 2 (April, 1986): 




because due to the secrecy of the confessional many of these elites who had made 
restitution did so under the public guise of philanthropy.
8
  
On the surface, then, if merchants applied the formal rules against usury in the 
normal course of commerce, in order to avoid ecclesiastical scrutiny, this meant that a 
prospective purchaser of goods was in the unenviable position of either having ready 
specie for all his purchases, with the possible effect of scaling down the amount of 
goods that he was willing or able to purchase, or in the worst case foregoing the 
purchase of goods altogether due to being unable to purchase an economically viable 
quantity. A potential lender on the other hand, who may have excess funds available, 
but having no clear occasion open to him for the purchase of goods, was loath to 
advance money to someone else for no return. Even if he did lend his excess funds 
under those circumstances the possibility existed for the loss of potential profits on 
any foregone opportunities caused by his now cash-depleted position.  The 
interdiction of lending money at interest was a clear impediment to merchants, in that 
it lowered the profitability of commercial transactions by severely limiting the amount 
of funds available on any given opportunity.  Although the ponderous influence of the 
Catholic Church, in the enforcement of usury laws on business practices, continued to 
be a lingering factor in Western European commerce right down to the end of the 
eighteenth-century,
9
 there was a means of subtly bypassing moral restrictions on 
usury. This involved simply not taking into consideration an implicit interest factor on 
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 Benjamin N. Nelson, “The Usurer and the Merchant Prince: Italian Businessmen and the 








the advancement of funds, through the use of bills of exchange. This legal contract, 
which originated in Genoa during the twelfth century, ingeniously combined a 
commercial loan agreement with a foreign exchange component. This contract simply 
stated that a certain amount was advanced and had to be repaid by a certain date, in a 
different location and in a different currency.
10
  
The abstract concept of foreign exchange is as enigmatic today as it was in late 
medieval Europe. There is no easy answer as to how foreign exchange actually came 
about in this early period. Raymond de Roover provided an explanation by indicating 
that foreign exchange rates during the Middle Ages were a function of the mint par. 
This denominator was difficult to determine due to the difference in the fineness of 
coins and to seigniorage
11
 variations existing in the denominations of the various 
currencies of different countries. Additionally, the foreign exchange rates were also 
determined by the differences of interest rates between two or more financial centres 
for bills of exchange. The importance of these bills, besides the extension of credit, 
was the transference of funds without the actual transportation of specie. Bullion or 
coins were rarely shipped between financial centres to settle debts due to the hazards 
and to the costs involved. Indeed, as long as it was more expedient, merchant-bankers 
preferred to settle debts by bills of exchange rather than actual specie.
12
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 Diana Wood, Medieval Economic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 201. 
 
11
 This term refers to the profit earned by the crown arising from the difference between the market 




 Raymond De Roover, Gresham on Foreign Exchange: An Essay on Early English Mercantilism with 
the Text of Sir Thomas Gresham’s Memorandum for the Understanding of the Exchange (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1949), 10, 40, 154, 167. 
8 
 
The inner workings of the foreign exchange market proved to be a source of 
angst and suspicion to individuals who were not merchant-bankers. Writing in the 
middle of the sixteenth century, Sir Thomas Gresham, in his treatise on foreign 
exchange, provided an insight into the attitude that existed in his time. He believed 
that international financiers, who were mainly Italian merchant-bankers, were a 
nefarious and subversive group who were collaborating in a secret conspiracy to 
bring about the downfall of England through a subtle form of economic warfare. 
English merchants resented the competition provided by these foreigners, whom they 
accused of dabbling in a wide range of devious business practices such as keeping 
domestic prices of goods high and impeding English foreign trade, as well as a host 
of other questionable practices. In fact, Gresham marveled that the merchant-bankers 
were able to profit and live very well without venturing overseas or buying any sort 
of commodity and seemingly without engaging in any real work. This attitude of 
suspicion and distrust extended from the general population all the way to members 
of Parliament, the higher nobility, and even to the Privy Council.
13
 The hostility 
toward the Italian merchants peaked in the years of 1456 and 1457 when London 
experienced a series of riots against foreign merchants. In subsequent years, 
particularly starting in the last quarter of the fifteenth century there was a gradual 
reduction in the number of Italian merchants operating in England.
14
    
Most of the current scholarship on the medieval economic climate dates from 
the late 1940s to the 1960s.  Of significant importance is the contribution of 
                                                 
13
 De Roover, Gresham on Foreign Exchange, 11, 104, 105. 
 
14
 E.B. Fryde, Studies in Medieval Trade and Finance (London: The Hambleton Press, 1983), XIV 330, 
331. [This volume reprints previously published articles with their original pagination, and thus here 
chapter numbers are given in addition to page numbers.] 
9 
 
Raymond De Roover whose books include Business, Banking and Economic Thought 
in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe; Gresham on Foreign Exchange; The 
Medici Bank: Its Organization, Management, Operations and Decline; L’Evolution 
de la Lettre de Change, XIV-XVII Siècles and articles such as “Early Accounting 
Problems of Foreign Exchange” and “The Medici Bank, Financial and Commercial 
Operations.” De Roover’s work extensively studied the management and operations 
of Italian merchant-bankers, especially the Medici. De Roover also provided 
important background information on the functioning of the bills of exchange and 
generalized the workings of the foreign exchange market. To this significant base, 
there were some important studies that contributed to the general scholarship of 
medieval economics within the last twenty years. Both Reinhold Mueller’s findings 
on the Venetian money market through his book, The Venetian Money Market: 
Banks, Panics and the Public Debt, 1200 – 1500, and J.M. Murray’s Bruges, Cradle 
of Capitalism, 1280 - 1390, explore the symbiotic relationships that existed between 
the various financial centres of Western Europe and their dealings with the rest of the 
Mediterranean basin during the late medieval period. The financial dealings of the 
Bardi firm of merchant-bankers in England during the thirteenth century is explored 
by E.S Hunt in his article “Dealings of the Bardi and Peruzzi with Edward III,” 
additionally, and E.B. Fryde’s Studies in Medieval Trade and Finance, delved into 
loan arrangements and various other methods of financing governmental and 
sovereign obligations by the English crown. Their studies are interesting due to the 
relationships undertaken by the English kings with various merchant-bankers. While 
10 
 
these investigations are important, they actually only provide background information 
to the foreign exchange transactions in which the merchant-bankers were involved.  
The base of the research in this thesis, regarding medieval foreign exchange 
gains by the Bardi and the Peruzzi, will involve analyzing a sampling of source 
documentation as well as other contemporary sources for the years immediately prior 
and subsequent to their respective bankruptcies. While the existing data is 
incomplete, there is a sufficient amount in circulation in order to perform a valid 
study based on a statistical sampling of these source documents. Federigo Melis has 
printed two volumes highlighting these sources; Documenti per la Storia Economica 
de Secoli XIII – XVI and Aspetti Della Vita Economica Medievale, both based on his 
research in the Datini archives in Florence. These will form a foundation of the 
analysis by providing the raw material needed to calculate the range of selling prices 
for a select group of textiles, as well as providing the cost of the raw materials, labour 
and other expenses such as overhead, freight, insurance, etc.  The relevant foreign 
exchange rates pertaining to the periods under investigation have been assembled by 
Peter Spufford in his Handbook of Medieval Exchange; additionally these foreign 
exchange rates are provided through the internet in a machine-readable format by 
Rutgers University. These volumes, as well as the documentation from Rutgers 
University, will provide the required information on prices, costs of various goods 
and services and the average rates of foreign exchange for the diverse periods being 
considered. The end result will provide an average foreign exchange gain on bills of 
exchange transactions. Hunt, in his A New Look at the Dealings of the Bardi and 
Peruzzi, and De Roover, in The Medici Bank, Financial and Commercial Operations,  
11 
 
have estimated how much of the total output of raw wool produced in England were 
purchased respectively by the Bardi, and the Peruzzi. In addition, the book England’s 
Export Trade; 1275 – 1547, is the compilation of data, by E.M. Carus-Wilson and O. 
Coleman, from the original customs documents of England that recorded the amount 
of wool and cloth exported from the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries. This book will 
provide the necessary insight of the volume of exports in the English textile industry.  
Therefore, what this thesis will accomplish is a detailed statistical analysis of 
foreign exchange transactions involving Florentine Florins and English Pounds 
during the fourteenth century. Unlike prior studies, this thesis will statistically follow 
the ebb and flow of foreign exchange rates as it relates to the two aforementioned 
currencies as the vicissitudes of war, pestilence, economic recession and liquidity in 
the form of silver affects the respective economies of Florence and England. This 
analysis will detail short to medium-term currency trends spanning intervals of fifteen 
and twenty years as well as a long-term trend, spanning seventy years. Whereas 
previous studies the effect on foreign exchange was simply estimated based on 
circumstantial documentation, actual statistical analysis was lacking. The strength of 
this thesis is the numerical analysis of the foreign exchange rates as they respond to 
the external stimuli affecting Florence and England both economically and socially.  
Commerce in the Middle Ages witnessed an incremental increase in the flow of 
funds and commodities in extra-territorial trade. However, within this trade lies a 
mystery that has been simply glossed over or ignored and herein lies the crux of the 
matter. How did actual foreign exchange affect the real value of capital used in 
commercial transactions? A complete commercial cycle involved the tying up of 
12 
 
sums for relatively long periods of time and the transactions, once initiated, could not 
be altered or stopped very easily. The complete round trip from Northern Italy to the 
Levant, back to Italy then onwards to Northwestern Europe and then back again to 
Italy took a good two years.
15
 Additionally, Italian merchant-bankers were habitually 
involved in what we now term a futures contract to purchase raw material years in 
advance from producers in order to keep the costs involved at their lowest possible 
level. As an example, English monasteries frequently mortgaged their future 
production of wool to these merchant-bankers, sometimes as far as twelve years in 
advance.
16
 Once the commitment was made the merchant-bankers were obliged to go 
ahead with the transactions, whether foreign exchange rates were favourable or not. It 
is, therefore, important to know to what extent exchange rates affected the 
profitability of merchant-bankers based in Northern Italy. Only once this is analyzed 
can the financial picture provided be properly appreciated.  
Besides the restriction on usury, an additional stumbling block that further 
decelerated the flow of funds, especially when it came to international trade, was the 
constant shortage of actual specie available for commerce. Northern Europe suffered 
an unfavorable trade balance with the Mediterranean region due to the constant flow 
of silver and gold to Southern Europe in order to satisfy the payment of imported 
goods. Further shortage was caused by the remittances of specie to the Papacy to 
satisfy various demands of religious dues and taxes. The amount paid to the Catholic 
Church was substantial. For the region of France alone it was estimated that the 
                                                 
15








equivalent of 300,000 écus were remitted by the French crown on an annual basis in 
this fashion.
17
 However, this is not to say that Southern Europe was awash with 
precious metals. In fact, this area of Europe was simply a conduit that channeled a 
large percentage of this gold and silver further eastward, to the Levant, in order to pay 
for the trade imbalance created in large part by the importation of spices. 
Interestingly, these precious metals did not rest for long in the Levant either but 
continued their journey further east, first towards Persia and then onwards to India, 
each geographical zone having a trade imbalance with the area immediately to the east 
of it.  At each stage during this route gold and silver increased in value and the trade 




Nor was the lack of precious metals the only physical impediment to the flow of 
specie for trade.  The costs associated with the transportation and protection of gold 
and silver against the hazards of robbery and piracy were onerous.  As an example, 
the relatively short distance from Naples to Rome could cost as much as twelve 
percent of the value of the transported bullion.
19
 Furthermore, the uncertainties of sea 
transportation also carried the very real possibilities of dealing with inclement weather 
and shipwreck. Into this mix merchants also had to contend with a large array of 
European coinage representing a wide number of denominations being minted in three 
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 Harry Miskimin, The Economy of Early Renaissance Europe, 1300 – 1460 (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1969), 138 – 149. 
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 Rudi Mattee, “Between Venice and Surat: The Trade in Gold in Late Safavid Iran,” Modern Asian 
Studies 34, No. 1 (Feb, 2000): 227-231. 
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 E.S. Hunt and J.M. Murray, A History of Business in Medieval Europe, 1200 – 1550 (Cambridge: 




different metals, gold, silver and billon. Billon was basically a debased silver coin 
which contained less than a twelfth portion, and in rare cases as little as a ninety-sixth 
part, of silver, the rest of the coin being composed of copper. More often than not, 
coins were also being minted in quarters, halves or even doubles of the standard 
denominations.
 20
 Therefore, the landscape of Western European commerce was 
hampered by the physical limitations imposed upon it by the relative shortage of 
bullion available for coinage due to a detrimental trade deficit. This reality was further 
exacerbated by an increasingly complex phalanx of currencies assaulting the 
commercial environment. These factors were serious obstacles for economic 
expansion due to their role in decelerating the flow of funds for trading purposes. 
To summarize, then, the efficiency of Western European commerce was 
seriously hampered on at least two levels. The first, and perhaps the most important 
factor, was the moral impediment imposed by the Catholic Church on the use of 
interest-bearing loans. The second consisted of the purely physical limitations on the 
circulation of funds existing at that time, specifically the lack of sufficient quantity of 
precious metals in order to provide the raw materials for minting specie, the large and 
complex number of denominations then in existence, and finally, the high cost 
associated with moving bullion from one marketplace to another.  
 This oversimplification of barriers to the velocity of funds in no way belittles 
the complexities that existed at that time. However, economic processes do not exist 
in isolation, rather they respond and adapt to the stimuli of supply and demand 
affecting the marketplace at any given time. Starting in the twelfth century, Western 
Europe experienced a period of continual commercial and population growth that did 
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 Peter Spufford, Handbook of Medieval Exchange (London: Royal Historical Society, 1986), xx. 
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not end until the onset of the Black Death in 1348.
21
  The simultaneous growth of 
these two denominators, of commerce and population, occurred within a symbiotic 
relationship that fed off each other’s economic inputs. As a result, the face of the 
marketplace was profoundly changed, significantly affecting the production process. 
The textile industry was an early participant and beneficiary of this change where 
production went from being simply a cottage industry to one where labour became 
increasingly specialized under a putting-out system. This shift is also significant in 
that the labourer no longer produced for the consumer, but rather for the entrepreneur 
who provided the work.  Here an important economic factor was inserted; that of the 
labourer being paid in cash wages that fed the nascent money economy, which in turn 




Within the confines of this money economy, with the specialization of labour, 
the concept of value enters the thought process of both the producers and the 
consumers. Value now has acquired the attributes of objectivity, a trait that is both 
quantifiable for analytical purposes and also provides the basis for social interaction 
based on the fluid exchange of goods and labour. As a result of this process, money 
also acquires a quantifiable objectivity; this creates the foundation where wage-
labour, price, and cost with their relationship with money, as a quantifiable agent for 
value, contribute to the idea of capital. This quantifying of the marketplace also 
facilitated the exchange of goods by providing the ability to record values associated 
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 De Roover, Business, 18, 128. 
 
22
 Richard Hadden, On the Shoulders of Merchants: Exchange and the Mathematical Conception of 




with the production and selling of goods and ultimately with calculating the 
profitability or deficiency of any given transaction.
23
 The acceptance of the concept of 
value also changed dramatically how money itself was viewed. No longer was the 
valuation of coins based solely on their role as a commodity, which was simply a 
reflection of the amount of precious metals they contained.
24
 Rather, money now 
acquired an artificial function as a measure for value; as such it became a medium 
where the concept of value achieved standardization. The acceptance of the 
standardization of money based on the quantifying nature of value was one of the key 
ingredients in the growth of national sovereignty. The other factors in the exercise of a 
realm’s sovereignty also involved a quantifying process, that of achieving a uniform 
standard of weights and measures.
25
 Therefore, the rise of the money-market economy 
was an important contributor to the idea of nationalism, in that it provided the 
parameters that defined the uniformity of quantitative standards necessary to achieve a 
hegemonic imprint over a given geographical area. Thus, with the growth of the 
money-market economy, the continued use of bills of exchange and of double-entry 
bookkeeping, money was transformed from having a subjective value based on the 
weight and purity of the commodity on which the reigning monarch stamped his 
image to a coin having a stated face-value and being accepted as such for the purchase 
of goods and services and for the payment of labour. This establishment of the 
societal construct of money having a quantified objectivity facilitated economic 
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growth by stabilizing financial transactions through the acceptance of value based on 
objectivity.  
Nonetheless, for the purposes of extra-territorial commerce, money proved to be 
a stumbling block for valuation purposes due to the large number of denominations 
then in use.  Originally, in the early Middle Ages, large portions of Western Europe 
operated in a monometallic monetary environment based on silver, which 
Charlemagne had reformed and legislated into use. The minting of these silver coins 
was based on the duodecimal system that operates on the multiple of twelve, where 
240 deniers or pennies were minted from one pound of pure silver. However, 
coinciding with the aftermath of Charlemagne’s death, the minting of coins in certain 
parts of Western Europe became extremely decentralized. Now, the right for a noble 
to hold a market on his land equated with his right to mint coins.  This passage of the 
minting process from the monarch to these lesser nobles created the situation where 
eventually a penny came to have a different value even in neighbouring areas.
26
  
The debasement of the bullion content in coin was an inescapable fact of 
economic life for the vast majority of individuals. This practice tended to have an 
inflationary effect on prices because, while the number of coins in circulation 
increased, the actual value of individual coins declined in relation to the value of 
goods purchased. One reason for debasement was a lack of bullion and the resulting 
disappearance of coin from circulation, due to wear, defacement, and export, and the 
resulting restrictions to everyday economic transactions.
27
 Another reason for the use 
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 Wood, Medieval Economic Thought, 81, 103. 
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of debasing was that it was a lucrative source of profit for those nobles who had 
received the prerogative to mint coins. This caused monetary havoc, if regularly 
abused, both for the general population and for merchants who had to keep abreast of 
the latest changes. Flanders was one notorious example of coin debasements 
extensively used to a detrimental effect. Starting in 1337, the silver content of the 
groot was gradually reduced by 50% stretching across nineteen different coin issues 
over the relatively short period of only twenty-seven years. At that time the groot 
existed in conjunction with a variety of other silver coins that Flanders also had in 
circulation. The resulting economic chaos from these debasements forced a much 
needed reform of the Flemish monetary system. However, the end result was 
desultory at best. The response consisted of issuing the double groot in 1365 which 
actually contained less silver than the original groot of 1337. In fact, the double groot 
coin was issued a total of six times over a nineteen year period; unfortunately, each 
incarnation contained less bullion than the previous one.
28
 The foregoing example of 
the silver coinage of Flanders, although a relatively extreme one even for the Middle 
Ages, sheds light on the multiplicity of coins and denominations in existence at any 
given time in any given location. The resulting dizzying economic conundrum is 
multiplied several times over once the rest of Western Europe is taken into account as 
well as the inclusion of gold and billon coins in circulation.   
The European use of a bi-metallic currency, through the minting of gold coins 
along with those of silver, was well under way by the mid thirteenth century. The 
commercial city-states of Genoa, Florence and Venice had gradually alleviated the 
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Byzantine Empire of its hegemonic economic position within the Mediterranean 
basin. These three city-states were, in effect, forced to mint high quality gold coins for 
trading purposes due to debased quality of coins that the beleaguered Byzantines had 
started issuing, and on which they had previously relied upon for such transactions.
29
 
Although both monetary systems, the gold and silver currencies, existed concurrently 
in Western Europe, they were in effect independent from each other. Gold coins had 
too great a value to be used on a daily basis for ordinary transactions; only sovereigns, 
nobles and merchants used these coins to effect large payments, usually extra-
territorial in nature. Silver coins, on the other hand, were used for mundane 
commercial transactions by the vast majority of individuals.
30
  
The inherent inefficiency of the monetary system in Western Europe curtailed 
but did not derail the economic flow of supply and demand. The newly emerging 
money-market based economic environment was undaunted as it grappled with the 
concept of value, the notion of capital, and the realities of the cost of production, of 
wage-labour and of price. A major handicap in this process was that the duodecimal 
currency system, then predominately in use, was more of a coin counting system 
because it followed the societal habit of counting coins in dozens, rather than a true, 
value-based monetary system.  Thus, allowing for regional differences in coinage 
terminology, this meant that twelve pennies would equal one shilling and twenty 
shillings would equal one pound which itself would equal 240 pennies. However, due 
to the complexities involving the various and arbitrary rates of debasement for the 
large numbers of different coins in existence meant that the process of reconciling the 
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values of coins from different regions was problematic at best. Therefore, for 
commercial valuation and accounting purposes a theoretical standard was established 
called money of account, which provided a standard of reference of value for the 
labyrinth of coinage then in existence. Indeed, for extra-territorial trade the function 
of money had to be more than simply a localized medium of exchange and a store of 
wealth. Money, as a viable tool for commerce, needed to be transformed into a 




Briefly, in order to clarify the process, within the borders of a given territory the 
accounting for commercial transactions was recorded in the local money of account.
32
 
For example, in England this meant that values for commercial goods were recorded 
in shillings and pounds sterling. As actual coins, shillings and pounds did not come 
into existence until the end of the fifteenth century.
33
 For extra-territorial trade within 
Western Europe the common denominator used was the gold florin issued by 
Florence. This coin was used as the standard because the vast majority of individuals 
concerned with the recording or the transference of funds across territorial 
jurisdictions were papal officials or merchants of Italian origins. However, for 
transactions between Western Europe and the rest of the Mediterranean basin, the 
ducat from Venice and the genovino from Genoa were actually preferred.
34
 
Interestingly, even as the genovino fell to one-sixth and the florin to only one-seventh 
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their original values between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries through the effects 
of debasements, as money of account they were immune to their actual devalued 
states. For trade and accounting purposes they retained the fineness and weight of the 
coins on which they were originally based.
35
 The transformation of money from just a 
representation of a certain number of coins to an instrument of value was being firmly 
established.  
The acceptance of money of account based on the original fineness and weight 
of the original gold coin provided the standard denominator for the establishment of 
value and the base for local and extra-territorial transactions to be recorded on a 
systematic set of well-defined protocols.  Thus, with the increased use and acceptance 
of wage-labour, price, and costs involved in commercial transactions, merchants were 
becoming acutely aware of the need to assess the relative merits, as well as keeping 
track of information on goods used in any given trade. The concept of value was 
instrumental in providing the stimulus for the need for accurate information, through 
the use of double-entry accounting in order to achieve this goal.
36
  Because the hub of 
extra-territorial trade was centered in the Northern Italian region of Lombardy and 
Tuscany, due to the high-quality of the gold coins issued by Genoa, Florence and 
Venice, the main strides in the development of double-entry bookkeeping occurred in 
this area. However, the original purpose of bookkeeping was not the determination of 
profit or loss of a given fiscal period or of a particular commercial transaction. Rather, 
the original purpose for bookkeeping was for tracking inventory used in production or 
shipped overseas and for calculating piece-rate wages and commissions due to 
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 What is interesting in the use of accounting records at this early period is the 
importance given to the concept of value. Although the information was on hand for 
the calculation of the abstract notion of profit and loss and indeed this was calculated 
when required, principally the values of goods and expenditures were given a higher 
priority as balance sheet items as reflected in the original usage of bookkeeping 
procedures. The value for the goods used in production or exported were recorded as 
goods-in-process or inventory, and this amount also reflected at the same time the 
amount receivable by them for the merchandise in question. The value of accrued 
wages and commissions were also a function of goods used in the inventorial process. 
Thus, the values of transactions were stated as amounts owed or owing, rather than 
amounts earned or expensed. 
The commercial acceptance of the concept of value not only provided the 
concurrent development of monies of account and double-entry bookkeeping, but 
perhaps more importantly, the acceptance of value allowed the introduction of bills of 
exchange. The use of bills of exchange held several advantages, perhaps the most 
significant of which was its response to the economic challenge imposed by the 
Catholic Church on the forbidding of usury. The mercantile environment was forced 
into rationalizing new business concepts and trading procedures into the framework of 
the accepted religious orthodoxy. This sought after conformity with religious scrutiny 
was a foremost concern for merchants in order that the pursuit of commerce became 
morally legitimized at a societal level. The basic concept of these bills, actually a 
contract between lender and borrower, was relatively simple. The merchant-bankers 
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advanced funds in a certain currency and place; however, repayment of this loan was 
due at a future date, in another territorial location and in another currency. The length 
of the loan was basically established by consensus and was known to all, and was 
established depending on the distance from the place of issue and the location where 
repayment had to be made. For instance, a usance bill drawn in Italy and repayable in 
London was established for a duration of three months. These contracts had no 
provision for an interest charge; because of this fact and that foreign exchange gains 
were deemed uncertain, this transaction was not seen as a direct loan with interest and 
was therefore, on the whole, acceptable to the Church authorities.
38
  
The acceptance of the use of the Florentine florin as the basis for valuation in 
commercial transactions as a money of account for Western European trade and the 
introduction of double-entry accounting provided only a partial stimulus for trading 
transactions. A much more important stimulus was provided by the overall acceptance 
of the bill of exchange as a legitimate tool for commerce by the Catholic Church. This 
outcome paved the way for bills of exchange to become an important economic 
accelerant in two ways. First, bills of exchange multiplied the amount of actual coins 
in circulation simply by writing on the loan contract the amount advanced, tantamount 
to stamping high quality gold florin coins. In effect, this created paper money through 
the use of the loan component of the bill of exchange. This is similar to the ability of 
modern banks to advance funds up to several times the actual amount of money they 
have in reserve.  Modern banks in this manner expand the volume of currency that 
circulates throughout the economy at any given time. Thus, in foregoing the use of 
                                                 
38
 Raymond De Roover, “The Medici Bank, Financial and Commercial Operations,” The Journal of 
Economic History  6, No. 2 (Nov., 1946), 154. 
24 
 
actual specie, the loan component of the bill of exchange contract created funds 
available for trade.  Secondly, their use increased the velocity of money flowing 
through extra-territorial trade, because individuals were now able to borrow funds 
enabling larger trades that could be completed in less time, thus expanding the 
potential for profit and increasing the flow of funds. Another advantage to using bills 
of exchange was that specie was not shipped in payment to complete trades. This not 
only saved the actual costs of shipping coins but it also addressed prohibitions from 
territories like England that had a bullionist policy against their export. Italian 
merchant-bankers actually preferred using bills of exchange since they were more 
convenient and less expensive.
39
 In addition, for the Italian merchants who used bills 
of exchange they also provided sound business advantages; their use eased the spread 
of risk over larger number of individuals who were basically approved by the lenders 




It was these Northern Italian merchant-bankers that pioneered and evolved the 
usage of monies of account, double-entry accounting and bills of exchange. In these 
commercial tools the abstract concept of value was quantified, thus becoming real and 
malleable. This systematization of business and commerce revolutionized the face of 
the marketplace, thereby establishing an economic paradigm. Now the nuances of 
supply and demand of the marketplace were able to be addressed within a relatively  
short period of time, in this manner satisfying the perceived needs and wants of the  
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new money economy. In addition, with the notion of value finally becoming a 
concrete denominator, merchant-bankers began optimizing their financial resources 
for both effectiveness and efficiency. For example, their extra-territorial commercial 
ventures were now being justified based on a rational set of expectations whose end 
results would increase the initial value of invested capital.  This systematic use of 
resources embodied at least the beginnings of a capitalistic business attitude: an 
attitude which Max Weber believed contained the following attributes: 
We will define a capitalistic economic action as one which rests 
on the expectation of profit by the utilization of opportunities of 
exchange….The important fact is always that a calculation of 
capital in terms of money is made….Everything is done in 
terms of balances…before every individual decision a 
calculation to ascertain its probable profitableness, and at the 





In the above definition of capitalism Max Weber noted that the calculation or the 
recording of values in terms of money for the amount of invested capital as well as 
the profit or loss of a given transaction is an important component of a capitalistic 
commercial environment. In this sense, the Italian merchant-bankers were the first in 
laying the rudimentary groundwork for modern risk management, financial reporting 
and the processes involved in modern international trade.    
However, the progress made in the establishment of the money market 
economy in Western Europe occurred in spite of being handicapped by short-sighted 
and ill-advised governmental economic policies, when policies existed at all.  
Positive economic legislation was considerably lagging until the latter part of the 
Middle Ages when the beginnings of the centralization of power seeded the 
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establishment of the modern sovereign state.
42
 Indeed, the normal extent of economic 
planning for state purposes usually extended no further than contributing to the 
personal wealth of the king and to his favorites.  Thus, merchant-bankers who wanted 
to establish trading privileges in a foreign territory had to be in a position to offer 
loans to kings and to the higher nobility in order to obtain their consent as well as 
their protection.
43
 In fact, the mingling of politics and large-scale business was 
ubiquitous and was the standard operating procedure. These types of dealings were 
also necessary, because to be truly profitable merchant-bankers were more than 
content to have this type of symbiotic relationship with the nobility. However, once 
the trading volume of these merchants grew to a certain size, these quasi-obligatory 




In spite of the societal and political obstacles the Italian merchant-bankers were 
able to use to great effect the commercial tools of monies of account, double-entry 
accounting and especially bills of exchange. As these tools evolved to become more 
commercially efficient, the types of business partnerships which these merchants 
entered into also started achieving a higher level of sophistication. This was 
especially true with the move towards the establishment of a more permanent form of 
business partnerships known as the compagnia which, in Venice, started in the 
twelfth century and became prominent by the fourteenth century. These semi-
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permanent partnerships replaced the colleganza or sea loan profit-sharing 
partnerships which usually lasted the time a trading voyage took to complete a round-
trip.
45
 These compagnia partnerships were legal entities with partnership agreements, 
such as the one described at the outset of this thesis, established not only the 
obligations that each partner had toward each other, but also predetermined the 
division of the actual profits and of the accumulated capital upon the dissolution of 
the partnership.
46
 The relative permanency of these entities enabled the partners to 
build on existing trading relationships, thus creating goodwill as well as expanding 
their operations based on this continuity.  
For extra-territorial trade, transactions were more complex due to the exchange 
factor involved in dealing with different currencies.  Ironically, it was this multitude 
of currencies that specifically created the opportunity to bypass the religious 
restriction on usury. The very nature of bills of exchange provided the answer, by 
allowing the advanced funds to be repayable at another time, in another place, and in 
a different currency. By combining both the credit function and the exchange 
component, the issue of charging interest was simply not addressed. This type of 
credit transaction developed the need for banking functions to be included within the 
range of services offered by these partnerships.
47
 Merchant-bankers were not 
specialized organizations. They dealt strictly with perceived opportunities: besides 
trading in all types of commodities and banking, they also delved into insurance 
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underwriting, and even in such esoteric activities as recruiting choir boys and hunting 
for lost classics, literally no stone was left unturned. It must be noted that, unlike the 
modern meaning of the term, banking in the medieval period meant dealing with bills 
of exchange. For these organizations, usually profits from trade were more important 
than those that came from the credit and exchange process.  Regardless, of this fact, 
dealing with bills of exchange provided the opportunity for increasing the value of 
one’s investment simply by the stroke of a pen. In these transactions, the merchant-
bankers had the advantage because the inherently speculative nature of exchange 
transactions were offset by the concealment of interest charges within the foreign 
exchange rates. Interestingly, the inclusion of an interest factor within the bill of 
exchange transaction was vehemently denied.  Merchants successfully argued that 
gains were not assured on loans that were involved with an exchange factor. This 
was, in fact, true; losses by the merchant-bankers did occasionally occur in bill of 
exchange transactions in spite of the efforts to avoid them.
48
   
Foreign exchange transactions dealt strictly with the concept of value. Bills of 
exchange did not directly involve the use of coins or commodities, or anything that 
had any real intrinsic value other than the paper that the bill was written on. Trades 
were completed, profits calculated, and commodities shipped, simply by the 
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CHAPTER  II 
THE EFFECT OF GOLD/SILVER RATIOS ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE 
 
Relative value or rather, more appropriately, the perception of relative value 
is the cornerstone in the foundation of establishing a foreign exchange rate 
between two different currencies.  Interestingly, this statement is as true today as it 
was in the late Middle Ages. However, the major divergent point with today’s 
financial landscape is that the Western European economy during the late Middle 
Ages was a hard currency environment, based on gold and silver. Therefore, 
theoretically, any change in the ratio of the metallic content of coins would tend to 
proportionally affect the relative valuation of any given currency. However, in 
fact, the gold/silver ratio of a given currency was only a lagging factor in this 
equation in the early part of the fourteenth century.
49
 The main determinant in 
establishing the various rates of exchange, given that extra-territorial trade was 
dominated by the use of bills of exchange, was the liquidity available in the 
money-market.
50
   
At this early period in the development of the Western European economy, 
gold and silver coins formed the backbone of all medieval economic transactions. 
Thus, as the fourteenth century advanced, the availability of gold bullion also 
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increasingly became the dominant factor in establishing foreign exchange rates. 
However, it was the availability of silver that reflected directly on the amount of 
coinage in circulation that, in turn, translated proportionately into a given level of 
liquidity of the money-market.
51
 Although the use of bills of exchange was 
imperative in extra-territorial trade and, indeed, was important in increasing the 
velocity of commercial transactions, they were, in the end, no substitute for actual 
coins in intra-territorial trade. It was this overwhelming dependency on silver 
coins at this juncture that proved to be problematic for the economic needs of the 
Western European economy. This situation was due to a chronic shortage of silver 
bullion caused, to a lesser degree, by normal wastage through gradual wear and 
tear, by hoarding, and occasionally through shipwrecks. But the overwhelming 
reason the shortage of bullion existed in Western Europe during this period was 
due to the large unfavourable trade deficit that annually existed with the Levant.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this massive export of bullion was required 
in payment for the much desired commodities of spices and silk by Western 
Europeans. As an illustrative sample, for the period 1376-1377, Genoese 
merchants imported slightly more than £626,000 worth of spices from various 
areas of the Middle East, while at the same time exporting only £248,500 worth of 
European goods to this same area.
52
 The magnitude of this shortfall had to be paid 
in bullion. If we extrapolate this shortfall to include the dealings with the Levant 
from other mercantile republics such as Florence and Venice, as well as from 
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other trading areas, we could well imagine the total effect on liquidity for Western 
Europe.  This bullion shortage was so acute, it was estimated that in the case of 
England, prior to the Black Death, the loss of precious metal amounted to 
£250,000 per decade. In order to appreciate the magnitude of this problem, one 
needs to put this number in its proper perspective: for the period 1311-1324 this 
figure was equivalent to 25% of all the coins in circulation in England, and by 
1348-1353 this ratio had grown to an astounding 50%.
53
 In addition to the massive 
export of bullion to the Levant, this increasing scarcity of precious metals was 
exacerbated by the decline in the mining of silver in all the relevant mining areas 
of Europe. At first glance, it would seem illogical that given the economic 
situation of declining liquidity and a shortage of bullion that silver mining would 
in fact be decreasing. However, the reasons for the decline in silver mining at this 
particular period were twofold. The first was purely economic and was, in all 
probability, related to the general increase in the cost of labour that occurred 
across Western Europe subsequent to the Black Death. This made the mining of 
silver, even with its relative scarcity, a losing proposition.  Secondly, the lack of 
sufficient technological advancements in the field of mining could not overcome 
the physical obstacles, such as flooding and cave-ins that occurred as silver mines 
went deeper into the earth, thus further compromising the economic viability of 
these mines.  These factors led to the rapid over-exploitation and depletion of 
those silver ore deposits that were still economically feasible for mining. Further 
compounding the dilemma of the Western European bullion shortage was severe 
                                                 
53
 N.J. Mayhew, “Numismatic Evidence and Falling Prices in the Fourteenth Century," Economic 
History Review New Series 27, No. 1 (Feb., 1974), 1-15.   
32 
 
political destabilization and warfare in the gold-producing area in Western Sudan 
which were the major source of bullion for Europe prior to the discovery of the 
New World. As a consequence, gold deliveries to Europe, although never 
eliminated completely, became severely constricted. Estimations have the total 
shortfall of gold shipments to Europe from Africa falling in the same proportion as 
the production of European silver.  However, even when the Tuaregs conquered 
the gold producing kingdom of Mali in the Western Sudan in the late fourteenth 




A noteworthy point in the relative scarcity of gold and silver is the circular 
interdependence of extra-territorial trade between Europe and the Middle East. 
After the gold shipments basically ceased arriving from the Sudan travelling 
across the Sahara, the Mamluk sultanate in Egypt was forced to rely almost 
exclusively on European gold bullion in order to supply its needs. Egypt likewise 
was at the mercy of its trade with Europe in order to be supplied with silver and 
like Europe, it too was suffering in the midst of a silver famine. However, it seems 
that the dearth of silver was much more extensive in Egypt than it was in Europe. 
Increasingly as time went on the value of silver in relation to gold became much 
dearer in Egypt than it was in most of Europe. The value and scarcity of silver 
reached such a point that copper coinage become more prominent in daily 
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transactions, indeed, so much so that Egyptian gold coins, the dinar and the ducat, 
were increasingly being quoted in copper dirhams of account.
55
  
Interestingly, Venice was the only polity in Western Europe not to suffer 
severely from a scarcity of gold bullion, although the scarcity of silver was felt in 
its economy to a certain extent. The reason for Venice’s fortunate situation was 
due solely to the geographic location of its founding. Situated at a confluence of 
trade routes, Venice was able to secure, in effect, the annual gold production of 
both Hungary and the Balkans. Additionally, Germany also exported a large 
percentage of its silver production to Venice. As a consequence, Venice was able 
to achieve and maintain a hegemonic position in the spice trade, since this city 
was the only mercantile centre that could finance the imbalance in trade with the 
East. In fact, up to 25% of her gold ducats and 10% of her silver, either in bullion 
or coins, ended up being exported to the Levant. The rest of Europe also 
benefitted somewhat from this situation, by receiving of up to 25% of the silver 
coins minted in Venice, recycled through trade, thus alleviating to a certain extent 
the overall lack of liquidity.
56
  
However, this lack of liquidity in the fourteenth century did not affect all 
Western Europe to the same extent or degree. The gold/silver ratios for any given 
kingdom or mercantile republic were generally affected not only by their relative 
proximity to sources of gold and by the relative demand of silver against gold 
bullion, but also by internal restrictions.  Table 1 below offers a snapshot of these 
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gold/silver ratios over a period of about one hundred-sixty-five years for territories 
covering most of Western Europe and Egypt. 
 At first glance the table below graphically reveals that the European 
liquidity problem started as early as the 1340s and continued well into the second 
half of the fifteenth century. Although the liquidity crises started in the mid 
fourteenth century, the situation became especially critical during the sixty-year 
period starting from 1370 to 1429, during this period the average gold/silver ratio 
for the combined territories sampled remained consistently below 1:11. The peak 
of this crisis occurred during the decade of 1410-1419, when the gold/silver ratio 
actually fell to below 1:10 for the first time since the height of the Black Death 
epidemic in the late 1340s. 
TABLE  1 
OVERVIEW OF GOLD TO SILVER RATIOS – 1310 to 1475 
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The above figures are based on the following: 
Prestwich,”Early Fourteenth-Century Exchange Rates,” 476,477,480. 
Day,”The Great Bullion Famine of the Fifteenth Century,” 34,40. 
Note: The ratios above represent the average amount of silver, in ounces, during the decades being considered 
          which would purchase one ounce of gold. 




In the second decade of the fifteenth century both France and Egypt were paying, 
in comparative terms, premium rates for silver in terms of gold: here the ratios for 
both these countries bottomed out at 1:9.4. However, it also may have been 
possible that in Valencia, although the data is missing for this particular period, 
the ratio may actually have been worse, if we visually extrapolate the data from 
the prior and subsequent decades. In the case of Valencia, gold was always in 
relative abundance compared to silver due to her historical role as an intermediary 
in the African gold trade.
57
 This role as a gold way-station for Europe apparently 
still existed in spite of the fact that the gold producing region of Western Africa 
was in a state of turmoil; as noted earlier, although the gold shipments from Africa 
declined, they never completely stopped. Due to this fact Valencia was seemingly 
willing to pay a premium from her relatively abundant gold position in order to 
receive an adequate supply of silver bullion.  
 At the opposite end of the spectrum were the mercantile republics of Genoa, 
Florence and we may also include Venice. If we here again extrapolate the data 
from the surrounding periods, they had the better of it, in relative terms, even if 
they too suffered from the restrictions of liquidity. Venice, it must be noted, had 
very little fluctuation in the gold/silver ratio from 1370 to 1429: if anything the 
gold/silver ratio actually increased during these years, whereas in the rest of 
Europe this ratio declined. This peculiarity was due precisely to the city’s 
proximity both to the Hungarian gold mines, and to the German silver mines, as 
was discussed earlier. Both Florence and Genoa may have benefitted from their 
close trading and geographic relationship with Venice to alleviate their liquidity 
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issues. An interesting note with these republics: although they did not suffer 
liquidity problems as much as others in this period, their overall situation 
remained relatively stagnant, while other territories, such as England, Barcelona, 
Flanders and Egypt, regained some of their lost liquidity in the decade ending in 
1429. This lagging trend continued well into the following decades at least for 
Venice, whereas Genoa eventually recovered to a ratio of 1:12.5 in the latter end 
of the fifteenth century. In the case of Florence, while the data is lacking, we can 
estimate the general trend if we take into account the data from the other 
territories in the last half of the fifteenth century, omitting Venice; such an 
estimation suggests that Florence had also recovered to a similar degree.  
The question of note is why did Venice not increase her liquidity position as 
had the other territories, especially when this city had access to ample silver and 
gold bullion from Hungary and Germany?  Apparently, it seems that Venice was a 
victim of its own success. The very advantage that had allowed Venice to achieve 
a hegemonic position in the trade from the Levant also contributed to a 
continuation of its liquidity issues. The decade of the 1420s was one of continuing 
economic depression, prices for spices and other items imported from the East 
simply collapsed, citing only the case of pepper where prices fell by as much as 
40%.  By the second half of the fifteenth century, while other countries were 
recovering to a degree, Venice was mired in a liquidity rut. A major contributing 
factor was the 1453 fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks, as a consequence 
of which it has been estimated that Western Europe lost at least 4,000,000 ducats.  
Even if not all of this huge loss belonged to Venice, we can surmise that almost 
37 
 
certainly a very large portion of it did. Venetian merchants who had heavily 
invested in the Levant were financially devastated, because unlike Florence, 
Venice did not recognize the notion of limited liability pertaining to outstanding 
debts owing in commercial transactions, thus leaving merchants personally liable 
for all their outstanding debts. Further aggravating the situation, that year also saw 
Venice expel Florentine merchants from within its boundaries; this action resulted 
in a deep drop in both bullion and credit.
58
 Furthermore, Venice was left 
economically reeling when additional bullion was siphoned off to finance military 
operations when outright war broke out against the Turks from 1463 to 1476.
59
  
Egypt by the 1420s seemed to have recovered reasonably well from the 
previous decade, although the figures are not entirely commensurate: the 
gold/silver ratio quoted for Egypt on Table 1 is the market rate whereas for the 
other territories the mint rate was used. Due to this fact, it seems that the mint rate 
may have been lagging to a certain extent in respect to the supply and demand of 
actual market conditions. It should be noted that for all territories, the market rate 
could never be below the mint rate, due to the fact that the authorities set the mint 
rate. Therefore, mint rates represented the minimum for any market rate.   
The case of France is interesting because, through most of the periods 
considered on Table 1 and against most other areas, silver was consistently 
expensive compared to gold. In this respect, France seemed to be out of step with 
the other European territories. The period covering the years 1345 to 1350 is 
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intriguing: the gold/silver ratio is especially skewed, and as such is not truly 
representative, compared to the both the preceding and subsequent periods, as well 
as to the overall data shown on this table. It must be noted that the ratio for France 
on Table 1 is the average for the period shown: the gold/silver ratio actually hit a 
low of 1:7.5 in 1348.
60
 Nonetheless, this aberration is very telling in regards to the 
existing social and economic situation at that time in France. Of the several factors 
that played significant roles in establishing a high premium for silver during this 
period, an intriguing social factor which may have caused the hoarding of coins is 
the coinciding of the occurrence of the Black Death in Europe, which peaked 
during the years 1348 to 1350, with this period of relative high silver value in 
France. Other external factors that siphoned silver from circulation, and which 
also applied to England, included the continuing military expenditures required to 
finance the Hundred Years War, and the adverse balance of trade with the 
economic zones to the east.
61
 This dearth of silver in France was addressed by 
aggressive debasements of the currency which focused on solving at least two 
main problems resulting from this situation. In the first instance, debasements not 
only introduced new coins into circulation with a diminished silver content, but 
more importantly, increased the volume of coins available for regional intra-
territorial trade, thereby in turn increasing the velocity of monetary transactions. 
Secondly, the issuance of these coins also provided much needed revenue for the 
French crown to finance military expenditures as well as other incidental spending 
necessary for the functioning of government.  These revenues resulted from 
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increased seigniorage income due to the minting of those new coins. Additionally, 
the realm was able to pay expenses and lower outstanding debts at face value with 
the debased coin, thereby achieving a net saving in actual value. This would be 
true, however, only in the short-term before the markets adjusted themselves to 
the new reality. Apparently, debasements were standard fiscal policy for France.  
Between the years of 1285 and 1490, France initiated a series of 123 different 
debasement of its silver currency, of which 112 reduced the silver content by more 
than 5%. The largest during the period considered on Table 1 happened during the 
years 1349, 1418, and 1420, which saw revenues from seigniorage dramatically 
increase as a proportion of total income, representing from 71% to 91% of total 
revenues for the realm during the aforementioned years. Ordinarily, seigniorage 
revenue would be almost immaterial, representing only 5% or less of total revenue 
for the kingdom of France. Seigniorage revenue was tied in directly with increased 
mint production of the new debased coins, and thus during these periods of 
debasements seigniorage fees did not decline, rather, more often than not, they 
increased. Additionally, the high percentage of seigniorage income must also be 
compared with the realities of the economic and social conditions at the time. For 
example, during the debasement of 1349, France was at war and regular tax 
collection may have been sporadic and for the years of 1418 and 1420, France 
had, just a few years previously, abolished a wide range of taxes, thereby 
proportionately increasing income from seigniorage for the realm.
62
 However, 
these constant debasements wreaked havoc on the economy. With each episode of 
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debasement the market prices for various commodities, as well as wages, were 
subjected to inflationary pressures that forced their constant re-evaluation creating 
uncertainty and economic stress for the local merchants and population.
63
  
In comparison England had relative monetary stability, as the crown 
subjected its economy to far fewer debasements during the periods considered on 
Table 1.
64
 Moreover, unlike France, England’s silver currency was considered of 
high quality and was eagerly accepted as payment in extra-territorial 
transactions.
65
 The stability and high standard of English currency was a 
contributing factor to England’s predicament of the dearth of silver within its 
regional economy.  Other factors which continually stressed the English economy 
due to the lack of silver were the continuing unfavourable balance of trade with 
economic zones to the east, and increased military spending, especially in the 
conflict against France. However, unlike France, which tried to deal with the 
shortage of silver with a dedicated policy of debasement, England, in 1344, set out 
to attract silver by the minting and exportation of gold coins. This pioneering 
attempt at a bullionist policy backfired because the English crown did not issue 
these gold coins at market value: rather these coins were fixed at a rate too high in 
comparison with the falling value of gold on the continent. As a result it was not 
silver but rather gold that was being imported into England, which further 
deepened the English dilemma concerning the scarcity of silver. Consequently, the 
decision to mint gold coins had long-term ramifications because once the 
                                                 
63
 Wood, Medieval Economic Thought, 103. 
 
64
 Rolnick,  Velde, and Weber,  “Debasement Puzzle,” 793. 
 
65
 Spufford,  Money and Its Use in Medieval Europe,  218. 
41 
 
momentum of gold importation started it proved difficult to stop. Evidence clearly 
suggests that the bullion market in England for the remainder of the Middle Ages 
consistently reflected a premium for gold compared with the rest of Europe.
66
 This 
is confirmed by the gold/silver ratios for England, shown on Table 1, for most of 
the periods being considered until the second half of the fifteenth century.    
However, England’s economy, unlike France, was in a state of flux. The 
economy of England was changing from being an exporter of wool to an exporter 
of cloth; the timetable of this transition is clearly demonstrated by the graph in 
Table 2 below. Note that Table 2 does not demonstrate the relationship between 
sacks of wool, which consisted of shorn wool each having a standard weight of 
364 lbs, and finished cloth, which was measured in rolls measuring 24 yards by 
1.5 to 2 yards wide.
67
 As a point of interest, from one sack of raw wool a little 
more than four rolls of finished cloth could be produced.
68
 What is being 
compared on Table 2 is the relationship of annual exports of wool and finished 
cloth to the total exports for each commodity for the 220 years being considered. 
If we exempt the decade ending in 1350 for both wool and cloth, due to 
incomplete data, what we notice is that raw wool was exported in proportionally 
higher volume during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth-centuries, fluctuating 
from 3.91% to 9.22% of total wool exported. By the last seventy-years of the 
fourteenth-century wool exports were basically flat, having evened out at roughly 
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80,000 to 85,000 sacks per decade representing about 2.0% to 2.4% of total wool 
exports, whereas the proportion of cloth exports grew with each passing decade of 
the fourteenth century. While raw wool never disappeared from being exported, 
the relative increase of cloth demonstrated its increased importance to England’s 
export economy. The proportional importance of the exportation of finished cloth 
to the whole economy is evident on Table 2. At a glance, the data indicates that 
the decade ending in 1390 was the period that delineated the transition in 
England’s textile industry from being principally a producer of raw material to 
where finished goods started becoming increasingly important. What is also 
 
The above graph is based on the data compiled in Carus-Wilson and Coleman, England's Export Trade: 1275 - 1547.  
 NOTE: For the decade ending in 1350; Data is missing for wool exports for seven of the ten years and for six of ten years concerning cloth exports. 
 
striking is that within a relatively short span of time, in the seventy-years, ending 
in 1390 England was able to build the necessary infrastructure of the finished 
cloth industry. The adoption and implementation of the necessary technologies 
43 
 
and skills required to succeed in such a short time frame indicates not only the 
abundance of labour, but also the increased monetization of the economy within 
the limits of scarcity of local silver. 
Although it was English merchants who originally introduced domestic 
finished cloth to Europe, increasingly this role was taken over by Hanseatic and 
Italian merchants. By 1347 the exportation of cloth had reached sufficiently 
elevated levels that the Cloth Custom was imposed.
69
 This change toward the 
production of finished goods was a major shift which contributed to the early 
monetization of the English economy. Individuals that were involved in the 
agricultural process of wool production were still employed in harvesting wool as 
the first stage of cloth production. The difference was that the wool was now 
being produced domestically into cloth instead of being exported to be processed 
elsewhere. This meant that not only were more individuals employed but that 
labour, as a whole, became more specialized. This transition further meant that 
silver as a unit of quantifiable value in the form of money used in the payment of 
wages, became increasingly an important factor in the equation of 
manufacturing.
70
 Cloth production at that time did not depend strictly on demand 
from foreign markets in order to be successful; rather the importance lay in the 
easy availability of labour and of wool. The problem encountered in this period of 
transition was insufficient liquidity in the form of silver in order to address 
properly the heightened need for labour. As a result, the shortage of silver 
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liquidity tended to lower the selling prices of the manufactured cloth without, 
however, proportionally increasing the foreign demand. The cloth industry was in 
this manner retarded in its expansion. Ordinarily, the existence of the cloth export 
industry would have been an attraction for bullion into the English economy and 
an offset against the unfavourable trade balance that existed.
71
  The problem was 
that the infusion of bullion was in the form of gold, whereas, wages, wool, and the 
production processes at the local level had to be paid in silver; additionally, the 
local market economy, in order to be properly monetized, also required silver. 
Money as a useful economic tool to measure value for goods and services 
could only achieve its full potential if sufficient quantity existed to facilitate daily 
mundane economic transactions. Without this requirement for monetary volume 
the monetization process slows down and the coins themselves become less a 
stated measurement of value than an asset in themselves, perhaps even to be 
hoarded for their bullion content. Since the English marketplace lacked an optimal 
volume of silver coins the overall pressure on the economy was deflationary. This 
is the opposite of what we noticed in France where the inflationary consequences 
were due to the continual debasements to which their coins were subjected in 
order to maintain sufficiently high volume. Ironically, France and England 
although following divergent policies regarding their silver coinage, produced 
similar results for their silver currency. In both cases silver coins were behaving 
more as a commodity based on their bullion content rather than a storehouse 
bearing a stated value. Nicolas Oresme, an early monetary theorist, maintained the 
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importance of an adequate supply of coins advocating that gold and silver should 
not be used for any other purposes until the monetary requirements are met. 
However, regarding what level of coinage supply would be considered adequate, 
Oresme provided no insight.
72
 This point underlies the importance of money as a 
key ingredient in any given economy, as an accelerant in the transaction process 
and as a medium of exchange, if it is easily available in sufficient volume and in 
consistent quality. Unfortunately, the general unfavourable balance of trade 
existing in Western Europe provided the scenario where the scarcity of silver 
bullion created increasing competition for this commodity, which in turn initiated 
rudimentary mercantilistic thought to take root. For example, in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries, England in exasperation could do little more than to enact a 
host of statutes and to issue proclamations against the exportation of silver bullion, 
which, on the whole, did not produce any real effect. Besides being difficult to 
enforce, this type of legislation did more harm than it provided actual economic 
relief: however, this fact was only recognized in the seventeenth century. Besides, 
the Italian merchant bankers, who had a major share of the textile market in 
England, not only were generally exempt due to their having permanent 
establishments in England, but they also preferred not to ship actual specie at all. 
Instead, they used bills of exchange to transact the transference of funds when 
settling their commercial debts.
73
   
 However, in the situation involving France and England, due to their close 
geographic proximity, the discrepancies in their respective monetary policies 
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simply exacerbated the liquidity crises to which England was being subjected. A 
report, quoted by Arthur E. Monroe in his book, Monetary Theory Before Adam 
Smith, from the University of Paris on the effects of debasement written for the 
French king Charles VI in 1412, stated that, “…la bonne monnaie est explusée, 
car les changes et les Lombars cueillent tout le bon or, et font payment de 
nouvelle monnaie.”74 Likewise, Oresme also believed that debasements caused 
gold and silver bullion to be attracted to economic zones where they have higher 
value. He also believed, as did the French, that foreigners were responsible for the 
orchestration of such movements of bullion. The belief that foreigners were solely 
responsible for taking advantage of the difference in the gold/silver ratio existing 
between these economic zones only reflected a general mistrust of foreigners that 
was prevalent in western medieval culture.
75
 In fact, it is economic logic that any 
given commodity would naturally gravitate towards a location where it was more 
highly valued, thereby increasing profits for the merchants, be they foreigners or 
local subjects. Such outflow would also leave in its wake a relative scarcity of this 
commodity. One could also assume that the greater the price difference, the more 
aggressive the outflow would be. This situation would hold true until a relative 
equilibrium in price for this commodity was attained in both locations, thus 
making its export uneconomical. Depending on the commodity, equilibrium could 
be attained only when the destination location would be saturated or when 
demand, for one reason or another, would no longer exist. However, in the case of 
precious metals such as gold, it would be difficult to foresee a scenario where gold 
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would actually reach a saturation point or where demand would precipitously fall. 
The reality was that the exportation of gold and silver went on in spite of any laws 
or of embargos prohibiting their export that may have been in place.
76
 Gold and 
silver then were exchanged for each other extra-territorially where the difference 
in the gold/silver ratios were sufficiently large, as was the case between France 
and England.  Table 3 below highlights these ratios that were previously 
discussed, for the years in which concurrent data exists for both countries. 
TABLE  3 
OVERVIEW OF GOLD TO SILVER RATIOS - SELECTED PERIODS 
LOCATION ~1310 ~1340 1345-50 1410-19 1420-29 
       
ENGLAND                          17.0  
                         
13.5  
                      
11.5  
                        
10.7  
                        
10.7  
FRANCE                          13.5  
                          
11.5  
                     
7.9  
                         
9.4  
                        
9.8  
            
DIFFERENCE IN RATIOS                        3.50  
                        
2.00  
                     
3.60  
                          
1.30  
                       
0.88  
       
PERCENTAGE 
DIFFERENCE 25.93% 17.39% 45.57% 13.83% 8.91% 
 
The above figures are based on the following: 
Prestwich, “Early Fourteenth-Century Exchange Rates,” 476-480. 
Day,”Great Bullion Famine,” 34. 
Note: The ratios above represent the amount of silver, in ounces,  
          that would purchase once ounce of gold. 
 
 
     
The only requirement in this physical form of arbitrage was that the profit be 
sufficiently large to compensate not only for the risks and costs of transportation 
but also for the seigniorage fees that needed to be paid to the merchants in the 
importing territory and the premiums that had to be remitted in the exporting 
territory to goldsmiths and others who handled bullion.
77
 Table 3 highlights the 
significant discrepancies in the gold/silver ratio that existed especially in the years 
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prior to 1350. Gross profit ratios of 17.39% to 45.57%, before transportation and 
other costs, would have been large enough to entice all but the most timid of 
merchants. In the fifteenth century although the ratios narrowed they were still 
wide enough to produce a tidy profit. However, by no means was the physical 
exchange of bullion between England and the continent a phenomenon limited 
only to the late Middle Ages. This primitive form of arbitrage was in fact 
practiced long afterwards by those who took advantage of the variations that 
existed between the gold/silver ratios of the different territories. So common was 
this occurrence that even late in the seventeenth century the existence of this 
practice was subject to intense debate. In an anonymous letter to John Locke, the 
writer bitterly complained that,  
Artful money-mongers….found that by melting down our weighty silver money  
…and sending it over as bullion to Holland, they could either pick up the guineas 
that had been formerly transported and scattered there, or buy gold (in the Ingot)  
at moderate prices, and have it coined here into new guineas; which return 




Nor was the trading of gold and silver limited to that between France and 
England; there was also abundant trafficking of bullion between Western Europe 
and the Levant. In 1453 the French merchant Jacques Coeur stated that, “Il a 
proufitt a porter argent blanc en Suyrie car quand il vault 6 escus par deca il en 
vault 7 par dela.”79 The small difference of one écu meant that the return on 
investment from this single voyage to Syria amounted to 16.67%, but much 
smaller margins were also alluring to these bullion merchants. As quoted by John 
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Day, in 1503, Bartolomeo di Pasi in his handbook for merchants wrote that, 
“…Venetian gold ducats, Hungarian gold pieces and silver money…are exported 
to Damascus at a profit of 4 to 5 per cent on the silver money….Standard 
Venetian silver…is exported to Alexandria…normally at a profit of 4 to 5 per 
cent.”80 These somewhat lower rates of return were deemed acceptable for 
ferrying coin and bullion over the fairly large distances between Europe, Egypt 
and the Levant.  Therefore, it was not surprising that gold/silver ratios between 
France and England in the fifteenth century, as per Table 3 above, seemed even 
more attractive due to their close geographic proximity.  
However, the above discussion demonstrates that the difference in the 
gold/silver ratio between any given territories was only one factor in establishing 
the rates of exchange between the various sovereign coins. If this was the only 
factor, then any change in the gold/silver ratio of the coins would only have a 
relative change in the exchange rates in proportion to the variation in the 
gold/silver ratio. In such a scenario the exchange rate would tend to gravitate 
towards a relative par rate, and any advantage gained or loss suffered would be 
temporary as the market rates would quickly adjust to the new par. As was 
discussed earlier, a stronger weighing in the foreign exchange equation was given 
to the relative liquidity of the currency of a given territory. This was due to the 
extensive use of bills of exchange that served a dual purpose in extra-territorial 
trade. In the first place, in order to increase the velocity of transactions, these 
instruments were used to transfer funds extra-territorially without shipping actual 
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specie, and secondly, they provided a source of short-term financing in the form of 
a bridge-loan for periods ranging from one to six months.
81
 The market for these 
bills of exchange was dominated by Italian merchant bankers who underwrote 
these instruments in a given currency and in a given location for funds to be 
reimbursed at a later time in another currency at another location. It must be noted 
that these bills of exchange had territorial and cultural boundaries that did not 
extend towards extra-territorial trading beyond Europe.  These bills of exchange 
were not an option to be used for European merchants dealing with Ottoman 
Turks in the Levant; trading in that area was on a cash basis only. Indeed, the 
seeds of mistrust ran deep: for example, one quickly notices this attitude in the 
correspondence left behind by those Italian merchants who lived and traded in the 
region. An attitude of condescension is especially revealed when Italian merchants 
are referring to their Turkish counterparts in their letters.
82
   
While the use of bills of exchange, by greatly augmenting the quantity of 
available currency, was of the utmost importance for trade in Europe, they came 
with a price attached to them. Although the charging of interest on any loan was 
specifically forbidden by the Catholic Church and was considered usury, this fact 
did not deter the merchant bankers from advancing funds with an almost certain 
expectation of turning a profit. The seeming contradiction of this situation was 
solved by these merchant bankers who took advantage of the differences existing 
between the various economic zones. In simple economic terms they purchased 
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where there was abundance and sold where there was want. This economic fact 
also applied if the commodity they were dealing with was currency, although their 
methods did not involve the exchange of tangible gold and silver specie in the 
same manner used by traders in bullion. Rather, they indulged in the use of the 
virtual currencies created by bills of exchange.  The addition of this level of 
sophistication elevated the status of currencies into intangible units of worth 
acceptable at face value. This financial instrument further reinforced the 
representation of currencies as bearing numerical units of value and not as mere 
commodities. Therefore, in order to increase the probability of turning a profit on 
exchange dealings and not be accused of usury, these merchant bankers preferred 
to advance funds, on paper, from territories that had relative abundance while 
ensuring that these loans were repayable in those areas that had a relative scarcity 
of liquidity. This play between the waning and waxing in the liquidity of various 
currencies created the necessary deviations from par which established the 
underlying basis for the market of foreign exchange dealings. These deviations 
from par represented the possibility of profit in the form of foreign exchange.
83
   
However, the use of bills of exchange also provided merchant bankers with 
an instrument that could be used to export bullion indirectly without fear of legal 
penalties from territories that had instituted bullionist legislative measures. To 
illustrate this point, once a bill of exchange arrived in England and funds were 
advanced to a merchant from the local branch of the merchant bankers who 
originally issued it from Florence, this merchant was free to purchase whatever 
goods he deemed profitable for export. In this case the bill of exchange would be 
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originally denominated in a gold currency, but exchanged for silver sterling, and 
as was discussed previously, gold was valued at a premium against silver in 
England compared with the rest of continental Europe. The goods purchased, for 
example wool, would be bought at a relative discount and exported. This 
transaction would be tantamount to importing gold bullion and exporting silver 
bullion in return. The downside to using bills of exchange was that the merchant 
bankers were exposed to the uncertainties surrounding economic conditions in 
territories far removed from one’s home base. It seemed that even in the best of 
times providing a relatively accurate estimation of future exchange rates was as 
challenging as it was an art for the merchant bankers. For example, during the 
early part of the fourteenth century a small Italian firm of merchant-bankers, the 
Gallerani, recorded the rapid and extreme fluctuations that a currency could 
undergo. They noted that in a ten-month period in 1305, the rate of exchange for 
the florin against the English mark sterling increased by 36.6%.
84
 The real danger 
in this circumstance was that, if the exchange rate quoted on the bill of exchange 
did not fully anticipate the rapidly diminishing value of the English mark, the 
merchant bankers would lose substantially in the transaction by providing too 
many marks versus the florin.  
Besides the state of liquidity of a given currency, the actual time allotted for 
credit on the funds advanced was another factor that heavily influenced exchange 
rates. The maturity dates of bills of exchange were set in such a way as to be 
longer than the average time it took to deliver ordinary correspondence to a given 
location. The delay to effect payment was the critical loan function of a bill of 
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exchange. This can be illustrated by considering two examples of the time delay 
given, or usance, between Florence and two cities; for bills of exchange payable in 
Venice the usance was twenty-days and those due in London three months. 
Furthermore, bills of exchange were usually payable “on sight” between Italian 
cities because they are located close to each other; this terminology meant that in 
these cases that they had an extra grace period of five days added on. The average 
time for correspondence to travel to those two cities were six and thirty-three days 
respectively. The usance effectively gave short-term loans of roughly one month 
for Venice (20 days usance plus six days travel time with an additional five days 
grace) and two months for London. As a rule the usance between Florence and 
various other cities were well known to Florentine merchants and were not 
specified on bills of exchange used between them.
85
    
But to really appreciate the elegant sophistication surrounding the use of the 
bill of exchange, one has to realize that frequently the credit cycle that a bill of 
exchange produced usually involved two or sometimes three different currencies 
as well as a host of different individuals.  For example, let us briefly consider this 
credit cycle as described by Bernardo Davanzati in the sixteenth century, which 
was also valid regarding the operation of bills of exchange prior to 1500.
86
  
Davanzati describes, using an actual example, as well as a diagram, how an 
original bill of exchange issued for 104 ⅔ scudi in Florence is to be exchanged for 
100 sols in Lyon. In Lyon the rechange portion occurs, which basically is the 
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reverse transaction of the original bill of exchange. At this point a new bill of 
exchange is issued for 99 ⅔ sols to be exchanged for 106 ⅔ scudi to the original 
issuer in Florence.
87
  This business cycle from Florence to Lyon and back to 
Florence netted a profit of 2 scudi or 1.911%; if we assume that a bill of exchange 
would have a usance of one-month for Florence to Lyon and another month for 
the reverse transaction to occur, the annual return would be roughly 11.62%.
88
 The 
very nature of transactions involving bills of exchange required that they be 
reinvested as quickly as possible in rechange operations or in the issuance of new 
bills of exchange in order to maximize profitability. This requirement through 
necessity promoted the velocity of transactions for extra-territorial trading in 
Western Europe and minimized idle funds for merchant bankers.  
The rate of return on bills of exchange is lower in comparison to the gross 
profit earned by the bullion traders in Europe, who had gross returns ranging from 
~17% to ~45%. But conversely, merchant bankers also did not run the risk of 
running afoul of territories with bullionist policies that forbade the export of 
bullion, nor did they have to handle and ship gold and silver with all the downside 
that it would have entailed. Additionally, dealing with actual bullion necessarily 
involved greater personal involvement, as well as actual investment by the 
entrepreneur, with perhaps lower overall volume of transactions due to the 
inability to leverage the amount of funds required. Conversely, the return on bills 
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of exchange compares very favourably with the ~4% to ~17% that satisfied the 
bullion traders that travelled to the Levant and this without the added risk 
associated with the handling and shipping of bullion overseas. However, the 
nature of medieval trade dictated that the shipping of bullion was a necessary 
requirement when dealing with the Levant, since credit was not extended between 
Catholic and Muslim traders. As was mentioned earlier, this traffic of bullion to 
the Levant was substantial and directly contributed to the unfavourable balance of 
trade existing in Europe.  
Bills of exchange, unlike bullion, created an intangible asset in form of 
virtual currency that was accepted and exchanged for local denominations of 
money at the satellite offices of the merchant banker who issued them, or his 
agents. As leveraging financial instruments, they had the ability to extend and 
multiply the available cash reserves that the merchant bankers literally had on 
hand. Because they were only a promissory note, not guaranteed by bullion, but 
whose stated value was solely based on the signature and reputation of the person 
who issued it, they signalled a foretaste of paper money in Western Europe. These 
bills of exchange compensated, at least to a certain degree, for the dearth of 
liquidity that existed in Western Europe by providing a type of generally 
acceptable alternate currency for extra-territorial transactions. Additionally, 
through their inherent credit functions, the velocity and magnitude of these 
transactions created a self-sustaining business cycle that increased marketplace 




CHAPTER  III 
CALCULATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE GAINS BETWEEN FLORENCE 
AND ENGLAND 
 
With the growing societal acceptance of the abstract concept of value the 
monetization of the Western medieval economies now became increasingly possible. 
What this meant was that coins, as a medium of exchange, were undergoing a 
fundamental transformation. No longer were coins seen as a strictly commodity-based 
asset whose value fluctuated according to the market demand of the precious metals 
they contained. Rather, coins were being transformed into a true currency, bearing a 
commonly accepted denominated value. This change of perspective signalled a 
paradigm shift in the societal quantification of value involving daily economic 
transactions.  Indeed, although the abstract nature of quantified value is strictly social, 
it nevertheless became very real in economic transactions.
89
  
One of the necessary stimuli in this process in the quantification of value 
involved the interaction of supplying the increased demands made on the marketplace 
caused by the growth of population in Western Europe. However, the continued use of 
the traditional cottage-based production was proving inadequate to meet the increased 
demand for manufactured goods. Therefore, through necessity, production evolved 
into a putting-out system, where labour became increasingly specialized and task-
oriented. As a result, labourers became responsible only for their portion of the 
production process to the merchant who supplied them with the necessary raw 
materials. Additionally, these labourers were also increasingly being paid in cash 
                                                 
89
 Hadden, On the Shoulders of Merchants,14. 
57 
 
wages in currencies that had a quantifiable value. As well, these labourers were also 
consumers who expected that their cash wages would be able to purchase goods at a 
given stated value proportional to their labour input. The growing economic cycle of 
supply and demand along with the increased synergic interaction between labourers 
and consumers reinforced the monetization process of the Western European 
economies.  Additionally, for business purposes the putting-out system of production 
also provided several advantages for the entrepreneur-merchant. Production of goods 
could now be better regulated and standardized in order to establish a consistency of 
output in order to meet rising market expectation. More importantly, labour now 
became a quantifiable unit of cost which could be directly associated with the 
production of goods. Therefore, for the merchant-entrepreneur, labour could now be 
expressed with a quantitative objectivity represented in terms of money and became 




However, the growth of the money-market economy at the local level did not 
evolve independently without the stimulus provided from extra-territorial trade, 
carried on in large part by the merchant-bankers. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
this type of large-scale trading was typified by the use of money quantified through 
bills of exchange. As a result, the cost of goods could be calculated in terms of the 
stated face-value of money.
91
 The problem with quantifying currency in Western 
Europe during the period from 1250 to 1500, especially for the merchant-bankers, was 
the frequent debasement of coin that occurred within the various sovereign territories. 
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In order to address this situation a currency-tabulating system known as money of 
account was instituted by the Northern Italian merchant-bankers. In effect, this created 
for all states that used it two systems of currency bearing the same name; on one hand 
the money of account was the measure of value for accounting purposes and in actual 
fact did not physically exist, whereas the actual coins were used as the exchange 
medium. Basically, the system worked as follows: initially, transactions were 
accounted or valued on paper as money of account that represented the fineness and 
weight of the denomination of coins as they were originally minted. Subsequently, 
when time for actual payment arrived, either goods or the actual currently circulated 
coins were then valued in terms of money of account. In this respect, therefore, actual 
coins were considered a commodity along with any other goods. This treatment of 
actual coin caused frequent variations in its value compared to the accounting value of 
any given transaction. For transactions within a sovereign economic zone, accounting 
for business transactions occurred in the local money of account. However, during 
this period, for extra-territorial transactions within Western Europe, the Florentine 
florin was the predominant money of account.
92
 The importance in the use of money 
of account was due to the uncertainty surrounding the stability of any given currency; 
as such these accounting funds represented only an equivalent sum, which denotes a 
qualitative value, and not an equalizing sum, which denotes a quantitative value.
93
 
Regarding the various branches of merchant-banking firms situated in foreign 
territories, notwithstanding the large number of different currencies then in use, for 
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accounting purposes transactions, for each branch, were recorded in the local currency 
of account depending where these branches were located. This was exemplified by the 
English branch of the Gallerani merchant-banking firm that recorded its transactions 
in pounds, shillings and pence.
94
 This principle also held true when merchant-bankers 
recorded funds that were either owed to them or from them, and to or from branches 
or correspondents based in other territories.
95
 Once funds were either transferred to or 
from these different territories, or indeed, applied against other obligations via a book 
entry, a foreign exchange gain or loss occurred and was duly recorded. However, it 
must be noted that the primary purpose of accounting at this time was not to calculate 
profit or loss.  Rather, the main purpose of bookkeeping, by the Florentines at least, 
involved a stewardship function that was centered on the balance sheet, invariably to 
keep track of various assets such as inventory and amounts receivable, as well as 
liabilities represented by such items as salaries and commissions payable.
96
 However, 
then as well as now, the main purpose of business was to earn a reasonable return on 
the funds invested in a trading venture.  
The previous chapter highlighted the bill of exchange as the main financial 
instrument that aided the process of extra-territorial trade within Western Europe. As 
noted the bill of exchange not only had a credit element attached to it but also 
involved an exchange operation. As Spufford has put it, the actual rates of exchange 
that were used for commercial transactions “…were based on a par value. The par 
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value was determined by the precious metal content of the two coinages on which the 
moneys of account to be exchanged with were based.”97  These various moneys of 
account were not all based either on gold or silver.  Additionally, the value of the 
precious metals themselves varied in respect to each other depending on the market. 
This characteristic was demonstrated in the previous chapter in Table 1, which 
detailed the divergence that existed between the ratios of gold to silver over a period 
of 165 years between various territories. The existing state of flux between the 
precious metals made the determination of the par value difficult to arrive at. At best, 
the par value provided a focal point around which the actual exchange rate varied.  
Interestingly, in those cases where the exchange rate exceeded the normal 
fluctuation around par, it was deemed more profitable, even with the risk factor of 
transportation included, to send actual specie abroad to have it minted into the local 
currency. This aberration in the foreign exchange rate was a rare occurrence which 
usually happened when disequilibrium in a given currency existed between two 
banking centres.
98
 However, the larger firms of merchant-bankers did not transfer 
funds directly between two branches. Often a third branch was involved, as an 
intermediary, in order to take advantage of accumulated credits in one location in 
order to pay the debts owing to another. Citing just one example, the Datini merchant-
bankers effectively used the credit balance owing to the branch in Bruges from the 
Barcelona branch to effect payments to Florence. This was evidently because the 
branch in Bruges already had an accumulation of debts owing to the branch in 
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 In this fashion, a book entry in all three locations, in their local money of 
account, recorded the effective payment or transference of funds from Bruges to 
Florence via Barcelona. These various entries at their respective locations cleaned up 
the books of outstanding receivables and payables, which in effect, consolidated the 
inter-company receivable/payable balances. The resulting foreign exchange gains or 
losses affected by these entries between branches of the same firm of merchant-
bankers would be recorded at the local level and would have nullified each other if the 
accounting records would have been translated into florins for recording purposes. For 
actual foreign exchange gains or losses to occur, transactions recording the purchase 
or sale of goods would have to happen with third parties, somewhere along the line of 
transactions, who were at arms-length with each other in terms of business 
relationships.  
Extra-territorial trade in medieval Europe was slow and involved a rather long 
period of time to realize profits, or indeed losses, for any given venture. To illustrate, 
a complete trading cycle for Venetian merchants involved the initial journey to 
purchase goods to the Middle East, returning to Venice with these goods, then 
proceeding onwards to various points in North-West Europe and then, finally, back 
again to Venice; all in all this was a two-year process.
100
 The initial trades between 
Western Europe and ports-of-call in the Levant did not involve any credit 
transactions. All trades between Catholic and Muslim merchants were, in fact, 
countertrades, which meant that, “…exchange is indirect, the money value of goods is 
understood…the parties are prepared to engage in a series of exchanges, each one of 
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which may or may not be profitable, as long as the venture as a whole is 
successful.”101 Literally hundreds of items were purchased in this manner by Western 
European merchants in the Middle East, most prominently spices such as pepper and 
ginger, along with luxury items such as silk and jewellery. In return European 
merchants effected payment mainly in silver, either in bullion or in coins. However, 
no foreign exchange gain or loss ever occurred in these transactions, between the 




The concept of accounting for foreign exchange gains or losses was only 
applicable on extra-territorial transactions occurring within Western Europe, where 
bills of exchange were in use.  The majority of these transactions was initiated in the 
financial and commercial cities of Lombardy, specifically, Florence, Venice, and 
Genoa. This was due to the fact that most Western European merchants who travelled 
to the Eastern Mediterranean to purchase the spices and luxury goods, as well as the 
merchant-bankers who issued the bills of exchange, were based there.  In addition, 
Northern Italy, besides serving as a waypoint for goods from the Levant to the rest of 
Europe, was also a centre of an important textile-processing industry.  It was the 
demands for appropriate raw materials made from the textile industry that spurred 
trading ventures to North-Western Europe. England was especially attractive because 
during the late medieval period eight different types of wool based on quality were 
known; the finest came from England, whereas, the poorest quality was from the 
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Apennine region in Northern Italy.
103
 English wool, therefore, was a magnet for 
Italian merchants who were especially keen on securing as much of this raw material 
as possible. The importance of having a steady stream of raw wool for cloth 
manufacturing in Italy meant that Italian merchants in England pre-purchased wool 
production years in advance. In so doing, this not only guaranteed the necessary raw 
wool at a given set price for years into the future, in addition, the Italians also 
negotiated significant discounts in the cost of the wool because of the cash advances 
made in securing the rights to this wool.
104
 Indeed, from 1280 to roughly 1400, this 
high quality raw wool was the chief export from England. During this period almost 
2.9 million sacks of wool were shipped to various locations in Europe, of which it 
seems that, on an annual average, at least 10% were purchased by Italian merchants. 
English wool exports reached their zenith between the years 1304-1309, when an 
average of 41,000 sacks of wool per year were shipped overseas. Interestingly, 
Florentine cloth production also peaked around 1310 at 100,000 pieces of cloth.  Later 
on, once the English textile industry transitioned into producing finished cloth for the 
export market in the late fourteenth century, Italian merchants were also found to be 
actively involved in this area, at times purchasing up to 25% of the annual English 
production.
105
  However, no trading venture involved simple outbound and inbound 
trading and freighting of goods. Northern Italian merchants were also extensively 
involved in various triangle trade routes involving England, which encompassed the 
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use of bills of exchange and the realization of gains or losses on foreign exchange.
106
 
For example, the triangle trade environment encompassing Italy-Spain-England 
involved more than just the exporting the spices and luxury goods acquired from the 
Levant directly to England; Italian merchants also traded some of these goods with 
Spain.  In Spain, the Italians purchased iron, almonds, oranges, lemons, sugar, 
liquorice and horses for re-export to England.
107
  
This significant volume of extra-territorial trade between the Northern Italian 
commercial states and England provides us with insight as to the percentage of gain 
the involvement in the foreign exchange market contributed to the bottom-line of the 
Italian merchant-bankers. Table 4
108
 below illustrates the relationship that existed 
between the rate of exchange of converting one Florentine florin into English pounds 
for the sixty-year period ending in 1360. At first glance, we notice that for the period 
in question, the exchange rates between the Florentine florin and the English pound 
were relatively stable, fluctuating between a high of 3.3343 and a low of 2.9240. But 
for bills of exchange issued in Italy and due in England, the florin started losing value 
against the pound following 1330. The florin finally bottomed out in the period 
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ending in 1345. Although the oscillations, in general remained relatively mild and the 
currencies traded within certain parameters, this decline represented a significant fall 
for the florin, dropping from 3.3343 to 2.99 English pounds. The florin did recover, to 
a certain degree by 1360, but never again did it reach the previous valuation it had at 
the end of 1330, achieving only 3.0225 pounds per florin. In examining the bills of 
exchange issued in England and due in Italy, we can see that the nadir of the English 
pound was in the decade of 1330, reaching a low of 2.924 pounds against the florin. If 
we compare the fifteen-year period, ending in 1330 to the period ending in 1345, the 
pound had recovered to 3.117 against the florin increasing its value by 6.6% versus a 
drop of 10.3% for the florin.  
TABLE  4 
ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES - ONE FLORIN INTO ENGLISH POUNDS 
FIFTEEN YEAR INCREMENTS, 1300 - 1360 
15-YEAR BILLS OF  # OF SAMPLE MEAN STANDARD 80% CONFIDENCE LEVEL 
PERIOD EXCHANGE SAMPLES (1 Fl = £) DEVIATION t-DISTRIBUTION 
RANGE OF 
DISTRIBUTION 
ENDING  ISSUED IN n x s t UPPER LOWER 
1315 ITALY 4 
                   
3.1075  
                 
0.3404  0.2788 3.3863 2.8287 
 ENGLAND 10 
                 
3.0380  
                   
0.3156  0.1380 3.1760 2.9000 
      0.2103 (0.0713) 
1330 ITALY 7 
                 
3.3343  0.0881 0.0480 3.3822 3.2863 
 ENGLAND 5 
                 
2.9240  0.3483 0.2388 3.1628 2.6852 
      0.2195 0.6011 
1345 ITALY 4 
                 
2.9900  0.3077 0.2520 3.2420 2.7380 
 ENGLAND 20 
                   
3.1170  0.1788 0.0531 3.1701 3.0639 
      0.0719 (0.3259) 
1360 ITALY 4 
                 
3.0225  0.3073 0.2517 3.2742 2.7708 
 ENGLAND 7 
                  
3.0357  0.0774 0.0421 3.0779 2.9936 
      0.1963 (0.2227) 
Data Source: Peter Spufford, "Currency Exchanges from Handbook of Medieval Currency Exchange"    
(London, 1987), in Rudolph M. Bell and Martha Howell, eds., "The Medieval and Early Modern Data Bank,"   
Oct. 19, 1998, <http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/memdb/search_form_mueller.php> (Nov. 14, 2011).    
 
Prior to discussing Table 4, it is important to keep in mind that merchant-
bankers were always seeking opportunities to lend funds where money was relatively 
scarce and tended to borrow where money was relatively cheaper. In effect, they 
66 
 
played the liquidity of the money market in one location against the relative illiquid 
state in another location. Clearly, under these circumstances foreign exchange 
transactions were heavily weighed to the side of the lender, rather than the borrower.
 
 
Although, lenders did suffer the occasional loss, by and large, they did not incur 
losses often enough or important enough to discourage them. In fact, if the merchant-
banker was adept, the only losses on foreign exchange he would suffer would be if the 
exchange rates were not in equilibrium. Even then these market conditions were only 
temporary because economic trends gravitate towards a state of equilibrium.
109
  
Although the data in Table 4 covers a substantial portion of the fourteenth 
century, the following in-depth discussion will concentrate on the forty-five year 
period ending in 1360, which was shown to be a particularly turbulent time in the 
history of England and of Western Europe. At first glance, for the period ending in 
1330, the range of the foreign exchange gain, with the confidence level of 80%, is 
6.49% to 18.29%
110
 on any given circular transaction; even if we average out these 
amounts we would still get a reasonable return of 12.39%. The implication of these 
high returns on investment is that this period was a time of relatively abundant 
liquidity for the Florentine merchant-bankers who issued bills of exchange to 
England. This scenario was a continuation of a downward trend for the English pound 
that had existed since at least the preceding period ending in 1315. We easily notice 
that bills of exchange issued in Italy had shown a devaluation of the pound against the 
florin, dropping from £3.1075 to £3.3343 or 7.30%.The bills of exchange issued in 
England show a similar trend for the pound against the florin, going from £3.0380 to 
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  The higher rate of devaluation for bills of exchange issued in 
Italy indicates that the money market in England was tighter, in theory at least twice 
as much so, over this prolonged period.
112
  All indications as to why this was so 
appear to be two-fold. In the first instance this was due to the booming English 
economy, which was almost wholly based on the exportation of raw wool.  England 
seemed unable to finance its economic growth fast enough or indeed to adequately 
monetize the internal demand for coinage. Upon examination of the customs records, 
we note that for the thirty-years ending in 1330, exports of raw wool accounted for 
23.66% of the total raw wool exported during the 220 year-period encompassing the 
years 1280 to 1500.
113
 This fact meant that the export market for English wool was 
extremely overheated, which, in turn, created a very high demand for the florin.  
A second and perhaps more important factor contributing to a dearth of coinage 
was the ever-increasing spending by the English crown. Therefore, in order to 
generate sufficient tax revenue to finance government expenditures that had 
exponentially increased from the range of £40,000 to £70,000 in 1300 to about 
£200,000 per year in the 1320s and 1330s,
114
 it was apparently deemed important to 
keep the wool exports flowing at a high level. The English crown and Privy Council, 
like all other medieval bureaucracies, lacked any real concept of economic planning 
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and foresight and simply pursued the goal of maximizing tax revenue through the 
collection of the customs duty.  However, in order to ensure a steady flow of funds the 
customs duty was not collected by government officials; it was instead in a sense 
farmed out to the Italian merchant-bankers to collect. In practice, the Italian merchant-
bankers advanced funds to the English king in order to acquire and maintain their 
royal prerogative in the wool trade, and the customs duty was used as collateral by the 
king, as well as a source of repayment for loans advanced by them. The English king 
used this interplay with the Italian merchant-bankers in the collection of the customs 
duty as a quick and easy solution to meet the rising demands of fiscal responsibilities 
and perhaps also to acquire a measure of personal financial gain as well. Upon further 
examination we note that the only real difference in the English economy between the 
periods ending in 1315 and that ending in 1330 was the drastically increased spending 
by the English crown; as we can see on Table 2, the exports of raw wool were 
consistently high for both periods. Therefore, by comparing the return on foreign 
exchange transactions for these periods we note a large discrepancy.  For the period 
ending in 1315 we notice the returns are modest, for bills of exchange issued in Italy, 
at only 6.21%. However, for bills of exchange issued in England the denominator 
represents the higher number of £2.90 in order to avoid a negative value, therefore the 
return in this case amounts to 2.46% or an average return of 4.34%.
115
 Compare this 
with the return on bills of exchange issued for England in the period ending in 1330 
which, as noted previously above, was 6.49% to 18.49% with an average of 12.39%. 
It is interesting that an increase of crown expenditures from £70,000 to £200,000 per 
year was, at least partially, responsible for an increase in the demand for florins to the 
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detriment of the English pound. We noticed that the average foreign exchange gain 
between the fifteen-year periods ending in 1315 and 1330 increased by an average of 
8.05%. Then, by mathematical inference, if the injection of an additional £130,000 per 
year affected the economy by 8.05%, then it stands to reason that England in the 
1330s had currency in circulation in the neighbourhood of £1,615,000.
116
 
Interestingly, as quoted by Martin Allen, economic historian N.J. Mayhew estimated 
that about £1,100,000 was in circulation as late as 1324; his estimates, however, only 
included data from eleven hoards and mint outputs from London and Canterbury, and 
excluded all other mint outputs.
117
 
As noted the resulting economic damage to the English pound can be easily 
discerned by the magnitude of the demand for the florin by reviewing Table 4 for the 
period ending in 1330. As noted the results for this period show a return ranging from 
at least 6.49% to an upper limit of 18.29%.  This level of return can perhaps be better 
conceptualized if we factor in the usance (this term denotes a period of time, set by 
custom) of a bill of exchange between Northern Italy and England, which is four 
months in one direction and eight months for a full circuit. In this circumstance, we 
calculate that the average annualized rate of return just on foreign exchange for the 
fifteen-year period ending in 1330 was between 9.74% and 27.44%.
118
  These values 
represent the extremities of the 80% confidence level of the t-distribution probability 
calculation. Perhaps more realistic would be an average of these returns, which would 
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amount to 18.59% annually, still a very robust return on investment. The two inter-
related factors of increased fiscal spending by the English crown and the high level of 
exports of raw wool led to a situation where the pound was continually pressured into 
a state of devaluation against the florin, culminating in the period ending in 1330, as 
Table 4 effectively demonstrates. The continuance of the ever-increasing value for the 
florin provided an obvious financial windfall for the Italian merchant-bankers who 
were all too eager to participate in reaping the benefits. However, these gains for the 
merchant-bankers occurred to the detriment of the English pound, which through the 
effects of devaluation created an inflationary environment that increased the cost of 
imports for England. 
However, in spite of the adverse effects to the English currency and to the 
economy through the effects of inflation, the export of raw wool, nevertheless, 
continued unabated during the subsequent decade. A review of the customs record for 
the period ending in 1340 readily indicates that large amounts of wool were still being 
exported through English ports.
119
 However, the fifteen-year period ending in 1345 
was afflicted with increased political and economic instability, both for England and 
for Florence. In 1337, the Hundred Years War began between England and France; in 
this major conflict, one would believe that the English would have been even more 
hard pressed for funds in order to sustain its war effort. Logically, therefore, the 
economic result for the English pound would be to continue in its steady course of 
devaluation against the florin. However, unlike the previous period, where the market 
conditions were conducive to absorbing large amounts of wool for export, the English 
King Edward III, in an attempt to further maximize revenue, concentrated the wool 
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due to be exported at the ports of Antwerp and Bruges. The rate of duty was also 
greatly increased for Italians and other foreigners, who were now being charged £3 
per sack of wool. The economic fallout of dumping massive amounts of wool led to 
severely depressed wool prices to a point where the Italian merchant-bankers were 
losing over £2 per sack of wool. Additionally, the Bardi and the Peruzzi merchant-
banking firms, in all probability to keep their royal trading prerogative, had lent the 
English king in the neighbourhood of £90,000 to £100,000 during 1336 and 1337.
120
 
The unfavourable wool prices, created by excessive supply, combined with a large 
increase in export duty along with an apparently inelastic market that was unable to 
absorb the increased cost associated with English wool, created a disincentive for 
merchants to participate in the export wool market.  
 Surprisingly, in spite of the negative economic conditions, the expected 
devaluation of the English pound did not occur. It seemed that the Florentines were 
even more constricted for funds than the English. Florence had become heavily 
involved in a politically, and as it turned out also economically, disadvantageous 
conflict with Venice against Scaliger Verona, that lasted from 1336 to 1339. 
According to the terms of the alliance with Venice, Florence was responsible to pay 
for the German mercenary armies fighting in Venetian territory.  The financial 
obligation finally amounted to some 600,000 florins that apparently completely 
depleted the coffers of Florence. By the end of the conflict, Venice even had to 
advance payment to the German mercenaries on behalf of Florence. Venice, once 
having achieved the goal of extending its territory on the mainland, promptly made 
peace, leaving Florence with no choice but to follow suit in suing for peace. At this 
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point the alliance between Florence and Venice turned sour. The apparent inability of 
Florence to repay Venice the comparably small debt of 37,000 florins had simply 
become an all too easy excuse for these cities to break off both commercial and 
diplomatic relations between them.
 121 
Fiscally still reeling from the ill-advised 
adventure with Venice, Florence was soon thereafter forced into the purchase of the 
town of Lucca for 250,000 florins by Mastino Della Scala in 1341, because he held 
captive Florentine hostages for that express purpose.  Subsequently, eyewitnesses 
stated that there was almost no specie to found in Florence; in effect the money 
market in Florence was practically non-existent.
122
  
The continuing illiquid position of the Florentine state finance was in part due to 
the dire straits which the larger merchant-banks, such as the Bardi and the Peruzzi, 
were themselves experiencing. They, having overextended themselves in continuing 
to advance loans to the English crown while losing money on the purchase of wool, 
could not adequately assist Florence in a time of fiscal stringency. The debilitating 
effect of poor economic and political decisions by the Florentine government coupled 
with recessionary pressures and commercial, as well as political, commitments in 
England on the part of the large merchant bankers proved to be disastrous.  The 
Florentine money market was substantially compromised and had proportionally 
shrunk to a much greater extent than the money market for the pound had in England. 
The dire strait of the Florentine economy is highlighted on Table 4, in the severe 
devaluation of the florin against the English pound in the fifteen-year period ending in 
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1345. The dealings in bills of exchange highlight the extent of the Florentine 
economic hardship. This is seen by comparing the returns of those bills issued in 
England versus those issued in Italy. Table 4 demonstrates that this period saw returns 
from 2.22% for Italian issued bills of exchange against 10.64% for those bills of 
exchange issued in England. For the Italian merchant-bankers their return on 
investment averaged 7.06% for this period.
123
 The business cycle regarding issuance 
of bills of exchange was in a state of flux, as the stringency of the Florentine money 
market was making it more profitable to initiate foreign exchange transactions from 
England. Now it was Florence that was in a relative state of want and not England. 
This average return is 11.53 percentage points lower than the results from the 
previous fifteen-year period. The question now arises; with the decreased return on 
foreign exchange transactions and generally unfavourable market conditions, why 
were the Italians still participants in the English wool trade, knowing the difficulty in 
simply making an adequate profit, if any, from the sale of raw wool? One reason may 
have been that the Italians really had no choice but to take delivery of the raw wool 
from the English. The actual contracts for purchases and payments were already made 
to the wool suppliers because the Italians were in the habit of contracting the purchase 
of wool production years in advance.
124
 Other important considerations also were 
involved. The merchant-bankers may have felt constrained, perhaps even pressured, to 
participate in order not to lose their trading privileges and their right to collect the 
customs duty granted to them by the English king in the hopes of having their loans to 
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him eventually repaid or at least drawn down. This would explain the large loans, as 
previously noted, that the Florentine bankers made to the English crown in 1336 and 
1337 at a time when their home city, Florence, was suffering through an 
unprecedented liquidity crisis.  
The large merchant-bankers, the Bardi and the Peruzzi, were left reeling from 
the economic and political fallout surrounding them. In addition, the fall of the 
gold/silver ratio by 26% over the previous twenty-years
125
 had cut deeply into their 
profitability; this reality coupled with the decline of the extra-territorial grain trade 
with which they were closely associated finally ruined them. First the Peruzzi failed 
in1343 and then the Bardi in 1346. The outstanding loans to the English king Edward 
III were not the only issue that made them collapse; these loans only exacerbated the 
existing situation. Subsequent records show that the Peruzzi were able to repay only 
35% of the outstanding amounts due to their creditors, whereas the Bardi repaid 
46%.
126
 Due to large discrepancy in the ratios of repaying their creditors it seems 
likely that the creditors of the Bardi were able to temper their situation somewhat 
since they had seen what could happen to a large firm like the Peruzzi and had in all 
likelihood started to restrict their exposure in the three-year interval between the 
bankruptcies. In addition, the Bardi were further handicapped by the city of Florence, 
which had devalued the public debt, in which they held an important stake. The 
Bardi’s perceived assets were effectively shrunken by legislation which, no doubt, 
increased anxiety among their creditors, because shortly thereafter, the Bardi went 
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 We could examine the extent to which loans to the English king affected 
the cash flow of the Peruzzi and the Bardi by comparing the above bankruptcy 
repayment ratios with that of another large firm, the Acciaiuoli, who also failed at 
roughly the same time, but were able to repay 50% of the amounts owing to their 
creditors. They had no outstanding loans with the English king.
128
  
The subsequent fifteen-year period ending in 1360 encompassed the passing of 
the Black Death through Europe between the years 1348 to 1350. The societal and 
economic disruption caused by this pestilence can be seen from the data contained in 
the English customs record. For the 220 year period ending in 1500, the only decade 
for which data is incomplete is the period terminating in 1350; the information that 
survives for that decade cannot be adequately compared to either the prior or 
subsequent periods.
129
 As for foreign exchange transactions, Table 4 above provides 
an interesting snapshot. The Florentine economy is in transition and apparently 
recovering towards the latter part of this period. A strong indicator of this is the 
sample means for the bills of exchange issued in Italy and England which are very 
similar, £3.0225 versus £3.0357. These results are a clear reversal of the trend from 
the prior period.  This suggests that the early part of this fifteen-year period continued 
with the same economic conditions that caused the tight money-market conditions in 
Florence and the devaluation of the florin, with the recovery of both the liquidity of 
money market and consequently the florin occurring during the latter years of this 
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period. In fact, this occurrence is shown to be true by considering Table 5 below. 
Using twenty-year increments rather than the fifteen-year period previously used, in 
order to take in the continuing economic factors that afflicted the florin along with the 
passing of the Black Death and comparing the results with the immediate subsequent 
period we can clearly see how far the florin had devalued prior to its recovery. The 
sample mean for the period ending in 1350 for the florin is 2.9260, with the range of 
return for foreign exchange transactions being distributed from .967% to 11.23% or, if 
the figures are tempered, there would be an average of 6.10% return.
130
 The average 
TABLE  5 
ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES - ONE FLORIN INTO ENGLISH POUNDS 
TWENTY-YEAR INCREMENTS, 1331-1370 
 BILLS OF  # OF SAMPLE MEAN STANDARD 80% CONFIDENCE LEVEL 





   ISSUED IN n x s t UPPER LOWER 
        
1331 to ITALY 5 2.9260 0.3025 0.2074 3.1334 2.7186 
1350 ENGLAND 21 3.1133 0.1751 0.0506 3.1640 3.0627 
      (0.0306) (0.3441) 
1351 to ITALY 4 3.0850 0.2265 0.1855 3.2705 2.8995 
1370 ENGLAND 15 3.0373 0.0670 0.0233 3.0606 3.0141 
      0.2099 (0.1146) 
Data Source: Peter Spufford, "Currency Exchanges from Handbook of Medieval Currency Exchange"  
(London, 1987), in Rudolph M. Bell and Martha Howell, eds., "The Medieval and Early Modern Data Bank,"  
Oct 19, 1998, <http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/memdb/search_form_mueller.php> (Nov. 14, 2011). 
 
return of 6.10% for the twenty-year period ending in 1350 shows the continuance of 
the devaluation of the florin and the stringent state of illiquidity of the Florentine 
money market. The five-year difference between 1345 and 1350, both using the same 
base year of 1330, highlights this continued decline. For the period ending in 1345 the 
average return was 8.37%, whereas, for the period ending in 1350 this figure was 
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6.10%. This small difference of 2.27 percentage points represents a decline of 27.12% 
in the average five-year return.
131
  
 However, this contrasts sharply with the subsequent twenty-year period ending 
in 1370 that highlights the economic and societal recovery of Florence. The florin had 
by 1370 recovered 5.43% of its value in the twenty-year interval to 3.0850.  The 
foreign exchange market also seemed to be shifting away from issuing the majority of 
bills of exchange in England to Florence since the fifteen-year period ending in 1330. 
The range of distribution for this period displays variances from 6.42% to 3.80% for 
an average return of 5.11%.
132
 Although this amount is still smaller than the return for 
the previous twenty-year period, the main difference lies in the fact that the larger 
return is now the result of bills of exchange issued in Italy rather than in England.  
The recovery of the money market in Florence was slow in the twenty-year interval 
from 1350 to 1370. The disastrous effects of the Black Death coupled with economic 
decline and political misadventures had taken a heavy toll and recovery took a 
generation. However, the merchant-bankers that failed were soon replaced by others 
and their involvement in bills of exchange clearly brought them a measure of 
profitability when dealing with England. Table 6 below summarizes estimated returns 
on foreign exchange transactions for the seventy years ending in 1370.  It must be 
remembered that merchant-bankers were opportunists of the marketplace; income 
from foreign exchange, though important, was just a supplementary form of revenue. 
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It was trade, as a rule, that generated the greater amount of profit.
133
 Table 6 shows 
that the annual return on investment for bills of exchange issued between Italy and 
England during the seventy years ending in 1370 averaged 10.48%. If, however, we  
TABLE  6 
AVERAGE RETURN ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 
FLORENTINE FLORINS AND ENGLISH POUNDS 
   GAIN ON CURRENCY - % AVERAGE  ANNUAL 
   UPPER LOWER  RETURN TOTAL RETURN 
PERIOD 
COVERED   RANGE RANGE % USANCE % 
        
1300 - 1315  6.21% 2.46% 4.33% 8 MONTHS 6.50% 
1316 - 1330  6.49% 18.29% 12.39% 8 MONTHS 18.59% 
1331 - 1350  0.97% 11.23% 6.10% 8 MONTHS 9.15% 
1351 - 1370  6.42% 3.80% 5.11% 8 MONTHS 7.66% 
AVERAGE VALUES 5.02% 8.95% 6.98%  10.48% 
Data Source: Peter Spufford, "Currency Exchanges from Handbook of Medieval Currency Exchange"    
(London, 1987), in Rudolph M. Bell and Martha Howell, eds., "The Medieval and Early Modern Data Bank,"  
Oct 19, 1998, <http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/memdb/search_form_mueller.php> (Nov. 14, 2011). 
   
 
    
omit the result for the fifteen-year period ending in 1330, for which profitability is 
skewed at 18.59%, the average annual returns fluctuated in a relatively narrow range 
of 6.50% to 9.15%, which would provide us an average of 7.77%.  The reason for this 
high rate of return for the period ending in 1330, as discussed earlier, was due to the 
lack of liquidity in the English money market, in part caused by increased spending by 
the English crown. Therefore, because implied interest charges were strictly forbidden 
on loans, these annual returns effectively represent the prevailing interest rates on the 
credit function of bills of exchange.
134
 However, because fifteen to twenty-year 
increments were used to calculate these returns on investment, it stands to reason that 
a certain amount of statistical smoothing, or flattening of interest rates, occurred. 
These rates of return do provide insight as to the amount of interest charged over 
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several medium to long-term business cycles of fifteen to twenty years each between 
Florence and England, as well as providing an interest rate over a very long-term 
cycle of seventy-years.  
There is no doubt that the parties involved in dealing with bills of exchange 
knew that, in all probability, the issuer would profit from the advancement of funds. 
Bernardo Davanzati, in the sixteenth century, openly stated such when he wrote: 
“L’ingordigia di questo guadagno ha convertito il cambio in arte: e dannosi danari a 
cambio, non per bisogno d’averli altrove, ma per riaverli con utile; e pigliansi, non 
per trarre I danari suoi d’alcun luogo, ma per servirsi di quei d’altri alcun tempo con 
interesse…”135 [Greed from this gain has changed foreign exchange into a business: 
where giving funds in exchange, no longer means having these funds available 
elsewhere for one’s own use, rather funds are advanced for the purpose to receive 
these funds back with gain; and taking these funds, no longer means to have funds 
available for themselves elsewhere, but rather, to use funds provided from others for a 
period of time and repayable with interest…]. Transactions involving the use of funds 
always imply an opportunity cost/benefit for both the lender and the borrower. The 
opportunity benefit for the lender is the expected return on funds while they are not in 
his possession; for the borrower the cost is the interest, or the difference in foreign 
exchange points, that are calculated on the funds that he received. In either case the 
important determining factor is usance, or the time the bill of exchange is outstanding. 
For example, Florentines did not prefer to transfer funds directly from Florence to 
Bruges or Paris; rather they remitted from Venice. The usance was the same, two 
months, either from Florence or Venice; the difference was that the merchant banker 
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retained control over his funds for twenty additional days, if Venice was used. 




The question now arises, how typical are the above rates of return on the bills of 
exchange with England compared with other trade centres in Western Europe that 
Florence or Northern Italians were dealing with? Table 7
137
 below compares selected 
returns on investment on foreign exchange transactions involving several currencies 
and the Florentine florin in the fourteenth century encompassing the identical fifteen 
to twenty-year periods as used for the English pound throughout this thesis. The 
above currencies and time periods were chosen based on the availability of an 
adequate volume of samples in each case.  Upon examining Table 7, we notice that 
there is no correlation between the various diverse currencies. Based against the 
common denominator currency, the Florentine florin, the return on foreign exchange 
transactions varies not only between the currencies themselves but sometimes also 
between the different periods within the same currency. The soldo of Bologna is an  
interesting example that shows the tightness of the money market that existed within 
its boundaries for the first fifty years of the fourteenth century. The margins on profit 
are much higher between this currency and the florin as compared to the other 
currencies being considered. For the first thirty years of the century the margins 
fluctuated in the vicinity of 17% to 18.60%, and then during the period surrounding 
the Black Death the yield skyrockets to 33.54%, indicating the almost complete 
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TABLE  7 
AVERAGE RETURN ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 
FLORENTINE FLORINS AND SELECTED WESTERN EUROPEAN CURRENCIES 
  BILLS OF  GAIN ON CURRENCY - % AVERAGE  ANNUAL 
PERIOD  EXCHANGE UPPER LOWER  RETURN TOTAL RETURN 
ENDING CURRENCY  ISSUED IN RANGE RANGE % USANCE % 
1316 - 1330 SUELDO OF ROME      
 BARCELONA BARCELONA 2.19% 4.20% 3.19% 6 MONTHS 6.39% 
        
1331 - 1350 SUELDO OF ROME      
 BARCELONA BARCELONA 0.43% 4.91% 2.67% 6 MONTHS 5.34% 
        
1300 - 1315 SOLDO OF ROME      
 BOLOGNA BOLOGNA 3.65% 2.03% 2.84% 2 MONTHS 17.05% 
        
1316 - 1330 SOLDO OF ROME      
 BOLOGNA BOLOGNA 4.56% 1.66% 3.11% 2 MONTHS 18.68% 
        
1331 - 1350 SOLDO OF ROME      
 BOLOGNA BOLOGNA 5.84% 5.34% 5.59% 2 MONTHS 33.54% 
        
1351 - 1370 SOLDO OF ROME      
 BOLOGNA BOLOGNA 0.93% 1.01% 0.97% 2 MONTHS 5.83% 
        
1300 - 1315 SOLDO OF ROME      
 PISA PISA 0.28% 0.08% 0.18% 2 MONTHS 1.06% 
        
1316 - 1330 SOLDO OF ROME      
 PISA PISA 1.26% 1.82% 1.54% 2 MONTHS 9.23% 
        
1351 - 1370 GROOT OF GENOA      
 FLANDERS BRUGES 4.70% 10.82% 7.76% 6 MONTHS 15.52% 
Data Source: Peter Spufford, "Currency Exchanges from Handbook of Medieval Currency Exchange"  
(London, 1987), in Rudolph M. Bell and Martha Howell, eds., "The Medieval and Early Modern Data Bank,"  
Oct 19, 1998, <http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/memdb/search_form_mueller.php> (Nov. 14, 2011). 
 
 
disappearance of liquidity, before dropping to 5.83% during the subsequent twenty-
year period. This is in sharp contrast with the soldo of Pisa which exhibited a 
relatively liquid money market in contrast with Bologna. However, even at that, there 
was a large discrepancy between one period and the next. The conclusion we can 
draw from Table 7 is that the denominator currency, in this case the Florentine florin, 
reacted according to the market conditions prevalent at the location where the bill of 
exchange was due to mature. The local conditions of the various money markets were 
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insulated by time and distance from each other. This can be seen by comparing the 
yields from Bologna and Pisa, cities that were relatively close to each other 
geographically and yet had completely diverse yields on foreign exchange. These 
rates were no more similar to each other than they were to either the yields earned in 
Bruges or Barcelona.  
If there is no direct correlation in yield for foreign exchange transactions for a 
single currency trading at different locations during similar periods, the question that 
now arises is how significant would the correlation be if different currencies had bills 
of exchange maturing at the same location during the same time period? In this regard 
Table 8 will briefly consider the results of this situation with two examples. In the 
data provided by Peter Spufford, there were not enough samples to include a third 
location, such as Florence, for the same time period in order to completely ascertain 
the results. In the early part of the fifteenth century, London was an important hub of 
two trading triangles that used bills of exchange. The cities involved in these triangles 
were London-Bruges-Venice and London-Bruges-Genoa.
138
 In considering the returns  
TABLE  8 
AVERAGE RETURN ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 
ENGLISH POUND WITH THE GENOVINO AND THE DUCAT 
  BILLS OF  GAIN ON CURRENCY - % AVERAGE  ANNUAL 
PERIOD  EXCHANGE UPPER LOWER  RETURN TOTAL RETURN 
ENDING CURRENCY  ISSUED IN RANGE RANGE % USANCE % 
1436 - 1439 GENOVINO GENOA      
 POUNDS ENGLAND 5.77% 4.73% 5.25% 8 MONTHS 7.87% 
        
1436 - 1439 DUCAT VENICE      
 POUNDS ENGLAND 7.05% 8.22% 7.63% 8 MONTHS 11.45% 
Data Source: Peter Spufford, "Currency Exchanges from Handbook of Medieval Currency Exchange"  
(London, 1987), in Rudolph M. Bell and Martha Howell, eds., "The Medieval and Early Modern Data Bank,"  
Oct 19, 1998, <http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/memdb/search_form_mueller.php> (Nov. 14, 2011). 
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on foreign exchange transactions between London and Venice and between London 
and Genoa, we notice that the discrepancy between the rates is not significant. What 
seems likely is that the liquidity on the English money market produced similar 
returns for the merchant-bankers based in both of those Italian commercial centres. 
However, the divergence in the rates is most probably due to the different conditions 
of the money market existing in Genoa and Venice. The lower rate of return in Genoa 
indicates a tighter market for funds than in Venice. All things being equal in terms of 
the money market, the merchant-bankers based in both cities would theoretically 
receive approximately the same amount of yield. However, the merchant-bankers in 
Genoa willingness to accept a lower yield indicates a greater inclination to participate 
in bills of exchange in an attempt to increase liquidity by profiteering through foreign 
exchange.  
The use of bills of exchange contributed significantly to the monetization of 
Western European economies by entrenching the concept of quantified denominations 
of currency. Originally this process occurred in extra-territorial trade mainly because 
of the use of bills of exchange and then locally through the use of wage-labour. 
Currency once quantified and accepted at the stated face value acted as an accelerant 
to the economy by increasing the velocity, as well as the theoretical quantity of funds 
available for trade. These processes were aided by the credit function of the bills of 
exchange that cleverly circumvented the prohibition of the Church on usury by 
disguising the interest factor on loans as gains on foreign exchange. This slight 
change of perspective aided the societal and religious acceptance of gain involving 
bills of exchange simply because of the perceived inherent risk associated with 
84 
 
foreign exchange. However, as demonstrated in the various tables in this thesis, 
adverse risk using bills of exchange was greatly minimized by merchant-bankers who 
were able to use the differential in the liquidity of the money markets of various 






















CHAPTER  IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
Bills of exchange created an economic paradigm within the Western 
European economy of the late Middle Ages by addressing societal, religious and 
logistical issues that stifled trade and retarded the growth of industry. Although 
bills of exchange were already in use in the thirteenth century, their full potential 
as a dynamic economic tool for expanding and promoting trade was only fully 
realized in the fourteenth century. However, in spite of the ambiguity that seemed 
to have existed within the realm of medieval foreign exchange operations, the 
actual functionality of bills of exchange was both elegant and yet, in many 
aspects, deceptively simple.  These were important characteristics in order to 
facilitate and promote their use between merchant-bankers and individuals who 
dealt in extra-territorial trade. Ideally, the goal of any economic tool is to increase 
the rollover of funds through increased rollover of trade. Merchants had long 
recognized this dual economic truism that increased profits derive not only from 
an increase in the actual volume of trades undertaken during any given timeframe, 
but that profits could also be increased if the quantity of units involved in each 
individual trade was also increased.  The second point is especially important on 
two levels: first, if the volume of trades could be increased and if the quantity of 
goods involved in each trade could also be increased then it stands to reason that 
the rollover of funds, and thereby profitability, would also increase proportionally 
to the volume and size of trades in a given time period. A second benefit would be 
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derived, that if a merchant would be able to purchase larger quantities of goods 
from a supplier more often, in all likelihood the overall cost of purchases would 
decrease due to the effect of economies of scale; however, lower costs for the 
merchant did not necessarily translate into proportionally lower selling prices to 
their customers.  
In review, the economic challenges that existed within the Western 
European medieval economy that stifled the rollover of trade, although varied, 
could be categorized into four major obstacles: the lack of liquidity at the macro 
level brought upon the unfavourable trade balance that existed with the Levant, 
which continually siphoned off large quantities of gold and silver; secondly, the 
burdensome, hazardous, as well as expensive transportation of gold or silver 
specie in the form of coins or bullion from one trade zone to another; third, the 
dizzying amount of coinage of various denominations, weight and purity that were 
circulating at any given time; fourth, the negative directives issued by the Catholic 
Church against usury and loans made for business purposes. The impact of the 
Catholic Church on medieval economic thought cannot be over-emphasized. As a 
societal insight into the seriousness of being accused as a usurer, in Dante 
Alighieri’s version of hell, usurers were reserved for punishment, along with 
sodomites, to suffer for eternity in the third ditch of the seventh circle. However, 
usurers held a more degraded position, being that they were bordering on the 
fourth ditch, slightly above those being tormented for fraud.
139
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Bills of exchange successfully addressed all these impediments, literally by 
the stroke of a pen. This was because their importance to the economy resided 
primarily in their capacity as vehicles that not only provided short-term trade 
credit to merchants but also eliminated the guesswork involved in the coin-
exchange operation from the hands of these same merchants that were involved in 
extra-territorial trade. As such, bills of exchange effectively acted as accelerants 
within the Western European economy. With the inherent credit function of bills 
of exchange, merchants were relieved of keeping large amount of specie on hand 
to conduct trade. Indeed, merchants were able to leverage the amount of funds 
they had for trade purposes through the issuance of multiple bills of exchange. In 
this fashion not only were they able to purchase larger quantities of goods but also 
were also able to conduct greater number of trades in a shorter period of time. 
Additionally, with the issuance of bills of exchange, the transportation of specie 
from one locality to the next was basically eliminated, except in rare 
circumstances. Paper replaced precious metals in conducting trades, thus making 
the cost of doing business not only less expensive, but also less cumbersome, as 
well as diminishing the possibility of loss through theft or shipwreck. To further 
highlight their importance bills of exchange also addressed the conundrum created 
by the myriad of coin denominations in circulation by creating a virtual currency 
which was based on an accepted monetary standard called money of account. For 
extra-territorial trade within Western Europe the currency of choice was the florin; 
however, for trade within individual sovereign economic zones each had their own 
monies of account. Therefore, the credit function of bills of exchange not only 
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enhanced the quantity of available currency in circulation at any given time by 
multiplying the amount of funds a merchant had on hand, but also provided a 
measure of certainty in the chaotic monetary environment that existed in each 
sovereign trade zone. 
Additionally, through the use of monies of account, bills of exchange 
provided the impetus that initiated the monetization of Western European 
currency and standardized protocols used in extra-territorial trade. This implied 
that cottage-based labour and manufacturing of goods gave way to the wage-
labourer who was paid in coins having a nominally-stated value and to the 
increased specialization of tasks in the production process. The result of this 
transformed the concept of coins from being a commodity, based on their content 
of precious metals, to actual money based on their stated value. Also, the goods 
now being produced had a greater degree of uniformity as well as a measure of 
standardization which were now increasingly produced in response to market 
demands. Along with the introduction of monies of account and the increasing 
monetization of the economy the abstract concept of value could now be 
calculated with greater certainty and scrutinized accordingly as the situation 
demanded. With this changing attitude merchants were now able, through the 
introduction of double-entry bookkeeping, to mathematically evaluate business 
risks, tabulate costs, verify profitability and assign values to liabilities and assets, 
which in turn, provided a standardization  of protocols in the accountability of 
business ventures.  
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However, it is in the intricate manner in which bills of exchange achieved 
their ubiquitous status in trade without severely disrupting the late medieval 
cultural and religious barriers associated with money-making that lies their real 
elegance. Italian merchant-bankers originally introduced the concept of bills of 
exchange coated with ingenious arguments designed to take advantage of the 
nebulous nature of foreign exchange.  The success of these arguments in 
convincing or, at least, confusing the situation even further was based on the 
desire to circumvent the Church’s directive issued in Christendom against usury. 
This was achieved by subtly substituting the inherent loan function of bills of 
exchange and interest charges applicable to these loans by disguising these 
transactions as a foreign exchange contract wholly subject to the vicissitude of the 
foreign exchange market. Thereby, simply by transforming the certainty of 
profitability of interest income on a loan into the presumed uncertainty of gain on 
a foreign exchange transaction mollified the religious and the societal outlook on 
these extra-territorial trade advances. Therefore, by simply stating that re-payment 
of the bill of exchange would occur in another location, in another currency and at 
a later time was sufficient to deflect excessive criticisms of the methodology used 
by the merchant-bankers to pursue profits in extra-territorial trade. Indeed, 
objections to foreign exchange transactions were often stalled in a quagmire of a 
never-ending circle of arguments and counter-arguments concerning the apparent 
secularization of sacred directives.  Concerning the confusion that reigned 
regarding the use of foreign exchange, these debates raged well into the 
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Renaissance and as late as 1553, as quoted by Raymond De Roover, Domingo De 
Soto, a prominent Scholastic theologian, wrote: 
This matter of exchange, although sufficiently abstruse by 
itself, becomes each day more complicated because of 
new tricks invented by the merchants and more obscure 





The confusion surrounding the use of bills of exchange as a valid tool in extra-
territorial trade did not impede its usage in the least.  The consciences of the 
merchant-bankers rested easy and their souls apparently withstood the temporal 
temptations seemingly inherent to involvement in trade.  Eventually, after 
centuries of use the bill of exchange became the mainstay of trade between 
economic zones within Western Europe, having become ingrained into the 
mindset of individuals as a matter of course in any of these transactions. All 
debates were inconsequential and effectively irrelevant, it was trade above all, and 
the pragmatists within the Catholic Church knew this and tacitly accepted the 
reality of the situation. 
Foreign exchange rates used on bills of exchange were affected more by the 
current state of the money market, which in many cases, as we have noted in the 
previous chapter, was highly localized and particular to each economic zone. This 
was especially evident in Northern Italy where economic zones were specifically 
centered on cities that had their own currencies and hence, their own sovereignty 
and sphere of political influence.  Therefore, political stability, or lack thereof, 
interacted with the vicissitude of the greater Western European economy to 
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individualize the economic conditions that gave rise to the pressures affecting the 
state of liquidity in each given location. Florence was a prime example of the 
effect of political instability on its economy while grappling with external 
recessionary pressures affecting its extra-territorial trade. The subsequent drying 
up of the money market is reflected on the devaluation of the florin versus the 
English pound for the fifteen-year period ending in 1345, as demonstrated on 
Table 4 in the previous chapter. The localized nature of the economic effects in 
Northern Italy could vary widely even between neighbouring cities as was shown 
on Table 7 when comparing the annual returns on foreign exchange for bills of 
exchange issued in Rome and maturing in Bologna and Pisa. For the two fifteen-
year periods, the first ending in 1315 and the second in 1330 the rates of return 
were 17.05% and 18.68% for Bologna compared to 1.06% and 9.23% for Pisa 
respectively for the periods indicated. These cities are relatively close 
geographically, being only 114 km distant from each other. However, the size of 
the political entity was not of any importance. This could be seen for economic 
zones that historically had feudal backgrounds that were ruled by a hierarchical 
class of nobility such as found in England.  Here, political sovereignty and 
influence extended outward from the central seat of government, in this case 
London, where control of the mints, tax collection and fiscal spending resided. 
Similar to the city-states in Northern Italy, decisions made in these areas coupled 
with external factors also affected the foreign exchange valuation of the pound 
sterling.  Therefore, relative proximity to other economic centres as well as the 
size of the economic zone were not decisive factors, unless war was involved, that 
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affected the foreign exchange rates; rather it was the liquidity of their individual 
money market that was the deciding indicator, as was seen on various tables in the 
preceding chapter. 
Evidence presented in the tables in the previous chapter determined that 
Italian merchant-bankers were generally adept at making money issuing bills of 
exchange regardless of the condition of the economy or of external factors such as 
the societal effects of the Black Death or the constraints caused by war. However, 
the returns made from foreign exchange transactions were good but not 
spectacular. Table 6 from the previous chapter shows that returns made from bills 
of exchange involving florins and English pounds averaged out to 10.48% for the 
seventy-years ended in 1370. Whereas Table 7, which detailed returns involving 
florins and various other Western European currencies, shows they only averaged 
12.52%
141
 during the same seventy-year period. Merchant-bankers were eclectic 
in their trade pursuits and did not specialize in any one sphere of the trade market, 
rather they responded to the market as they saw opportunities.
142
 As a result their 
profit centres were not concentrated in any one area and their business risk was 
similarly spread out. If they, as merchants, rather than bankers, perceived that a 
certain product or material was in short supply, they either strove to purchase as 
much as they could or to acquire the right, to the exclusion of others, of 
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purchasing large quantities in the hope of gaining a hegemonic trade position at 
the location where they hoped to sell the product.
143
  
Interestingly, the range of the percentage of profit made by merchant-
bankers through their individual business endeavours was relatively consistent. 
This implied that merchant-bankers, as a group, and perhaps merchants in general 
had certain minimum returns already set as economic goals in their trading 
endeavours. As shown above dealings in the foreign exchange market offered a 
return of 10.48% to 12.52% for the seventy-years ending in 1370. These 
percentages are comparable with the returns tabulated from the documents found 
in the Datini archives. One example details the sale of 47 pieces of cloth in 1384; 
after expenses the net profit was found to be 9.31% of the gross selling price.
144
 In 
his analysis, Federigo Melis was able to group his findings on the profitability of 
cloth sales into various categories based on the information found on the source 
documents; on one chart he detailed the profitability of 217 cloths sold based on 
the origin of the wool used in manufacturing, where the percentage of profitability 
came to 11.54%;
145
 on another, Melis detailed percentage of profit based on sales 
to various customers, and here the profitability came to 16.25%.
146
 By taking a 
simple average of the profitability on the sale of cloth found in the documentation 
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from the Datini records, one arrives at a return of 12.37%.
147
 This phenomenon of 
striving to achieve a certain rate of return was not peculiar to merchants based in 
Florence only. The Venetian merchant, Andrea Barbarigo, declared that he made 
an annual profit of 15%, by earning 2,000 ducats on an initial investment of 6,000 
ducats over a two-year period.
148
 These rates of return discussed above applied to 
transactions initiated and completed within Western Europe. However, the rate of 
return for trades dealing with the Levant was much higher. In the fifteenth 
century, the difference in price between Venice and the Levant was 50% on most 
items such as pepper. Some goods commanded an even higher price; for example; 
cloves were 72% higher, nutmeg 220%, cotton could be as much as 92% more. 
After expenses the profit margin on these highly sought goods could range 
anywhere from 35% to 50%.
149
 However, as discussed previously, bills of 
exchange were only honoured for extra-territorial trade within the geographical 
confines of Western Europe. All dealings with Muslims in the Levant were on a 
cash-basis involving either specie in some form or the exchange of goods. Credit 
in one guise or another was never extended by either party.
150
  
Although merchant-bankers, in the fourteenth century, carried on a 
profitable business in foreign exchange, the earnings generated from their dealings 
in this medium were sorely insufficient to stem the outflow of funds that 
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ultimately led to their downfall. The years from 1343 to 1345 proved to be 
especially disastrous for merchant-bankers; the Bardi, Peruzzi and the Acciaiuoli 
firms - the pillars of Christendom, - all suffered bankruptcy and had to be 
liquidated in order to satisfy their creditors.
151
 These firms were apparently 
profitable; however, their downfall proved to be their perceived lack of liquidity in 
the face of a recessionary economic environment combined with the cascading 
effects of war both on the home front and abroad on the continent, pestilence, the 
continuing long-term devaluation of gold, and the decline of their involvement in 
the extra-territorial grain trade. In the case of the Bardi and the Peruzzi one could 
also add their quasi-obligatory adherence in appeasing the English king with loan 
advances, apparently hoping that their continued favoured position with the king 
would aid them in weathering the economic storm. It did not, and their place in 
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